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Sammendrag: 
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spørsmål knytt til langsiktige mål for 
klimapolitikken, og til rammene for 
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Studien gjev eit grunnlag for arbeidet med global 
klimapolitikk etter 2012, enten Kyotoprotokollen 
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til breiare deltaking i framtidige klimaavtaler enn 
det ein har klart i Kyotoprotokollen, spesielt frå 
USA og utviklingslanda si side, samt å få til 
omfattande reduksjonar av globale 
klimagassutslepp for å unngå at den 
menneskeskapte klimaendringa kjem ut av 
kontroll. Drøftinga av klimamål er delt inn i 
fordelar og utfordringar med langsiktige globale 
klimamål, mål knytt til konsentrasjonen av 
klimagassar i atmosfæren, mål knytt til 
konsekvensar av klimaendringar, og spørsmål 
knytt til fastsetjinga av kortsiktige utsleppsmål 
som ledd i oppfyllinga av eit langsiktig mål. 
Drøftinga av gjennomføring av klimapolitikken er 
inndelt i arkitektur for framtidig klimapolitikk, 
ulike typar nasjonale forpliktingar under ein 
globale avtale, og differensiering av innsatsen 
mellom land for å redusere klimagassutsleppa. 
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commitments under a global agreement, and 
differentiation of national emissions reductions 
targets. 
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Executive summary 
 
New creativity is needed for the further development of global climate policy. The future of 
the Kyoto Protocol is uncertain due to Russian hesitation to ratify. According to the Kyoto 
Protocol, negotiations on commitments for the period after 2012 should at latest commence 
by 2005 and be finalized by the end of 2007. If the protocol should not enter into force, more 
fundamental issues on the design and negotiation of international cooperation modes must be 
raised. 
 
The aim of this study is to provide an underpinning for this thinking and the formulation of 
future climate policy through a comprehensive survey of the literature. An increased 
understanding of the main issues, challenges, questions, solutions suggested so far, and the 
inter-linkages between these issues is a fundamental prerequisite for the process. Major 
challenges are first to induce broader participation in climate policy, foremost the 
involvement of the USA and developing countries, and second to induce depth in mitigation 
efforts, which refers to the necessity to achieve substantial reductions in global greenhouse 
gas emissions over the next decades to avoid a sizeable man-made climate change.  
 
The survey is divided into two main sections based on a top-down climate policy 
development design. The first part is on defining long-term targets for climate policy, whereas 
the second part investigates climate policy frameworks. Climate policy should meet criteria 
such as environmental integrity (achieving deep global GHG emission reductions), cost-
effectiveness, political feasibility (broad participation), and technical feasibility (in 
negotiations and implementation). 
 
According to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) the 
ultimate objective for climate policy is, “stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the 
atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the 
climate system” (Article 2). However, developing policies requires a specific interpretation of 
this general principle. Even if adopting a specific long-term target at least at present seems 
infeasible, and it is difficult for politicians to commit to a long-term global target, there are a 
number of attached potential benefits. A long-term target can present a point of departure for 
setting short-term targets and assessing progress, induce technological change, and promote 
awareness and mobilize society. Such targets can be defined in terms of concentration of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, which is closely related to radiative forcing, or to 
temperature rise. They could alternatively be defined in terms of allowable impacts from 
climate change on ecosystems and society. Because our major climate concerns are linked to 
impacts from climate change, basing a long-term target on climate impacts has intuitive 
appeal. On the other hand, it raises difficulties in terms of what indicators to choose and how 
to compare impacts across indicators and countries/regions. Meeting a long-term target 
implies choosing a consistent global emission path, where one aspect is the choice between 
early or delayed mitigation efforts. 
 
Future climate action can build on different frameworks. The discussion in this report is 
structured around three levels organized in a hierarchical manner, where the first relates to the 
architecture of future actions. Architecture refers to fundamental decisions in the design of 
global climate policy, such as whether or not it fully or partly builds on United Nations 
institutions such as the climate agreements. Other fundamental decisions relate to whether or 
not the policy aims at specific short-term emission targets or rather at moving us in the right 
direction; the coordination level of the policy (global, regional, national, or sectoral); 
grouping of countries; and the choice of allowing only one or more commitment types for 
each nation and between nations. Additional issues for global climate policy design include 
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how to integrate development and climate policy in poor countries, and how to combine 
mitigation and adaptation policies. 
 
The second level is represented by climate policy commitment types. We present different 
types of commitments that all could contribute to reduced emissions. Finally, the third level 
relates to various ways of differentiating such commitments, given that one or more 
commitment types have been selected. Lastly, we discuss criteria that are useful for assessing 
these schemes. 
 
The major conclusions of this survey are summarized in six points: 
 
1. A flexible approach is needed to ensure broad participation and significant emission 
reductions. The flexibility could be along four dimensions: choice of commitment type(s), 
methods of differentiating across countries, timing with regard to when certain groups 
(foremost poor countries) take on commitments, and inclusion of substances that indirectly 
affect climate. 
 
2. Progress in negotiations will be best served by more focus on moving in the right long-term 
direction in order to keep future options open than on meeting specific short-term global 
emission caps.  
 
3. Mitigation costs and participation attractiveness should be given sufficient attention when 
evaluating different emission paths meeting the same temperature increase ceiling. 
 
4. All things considered, concentration and temperature targets are a better choice than 
impacts-based targets. However, better information on the distribution in time and space of 
impacts given a climate change scenario is a valuable input to decisions on emission, 
concentrations and temperature based targets. 
 
5. A coalition of most willing nations could be an interesting supplement to a global UN-
based process (building on UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol), and in particular if the Kyoto 
Protocol should fail. 
 
6. Some type of international coordination of climate policy is required because of both cost-
effectiveness concerns (to employ flexibility mechanisms) and attractiveness for broad 
participation. Increased cost-effectiveness could make more ambitious policies attainable. 
Nations’ willingness and efforts to manage the climate system given its nature as a global 
common property resource will be conditional on the efforts by other nations.  
 
Norway’s contributions in particular can include the following:  
 
1. Norway can contribute to bridging countries across the Atlantic and the North-South 
climate policy cleavage. In this regard Norway can take advantage of its good relations 
with developing countries and its large official development aid contributions. There is a 
potential for better integration of sustainability and climate policies in development 
policies and assistance. Furthermore, Norway could contribute to better integration of 
climate change impacts and adaptation, and emission abatement policies. 
 
2. As a country with a strong climate research tradition, Norway could invest in 
conducting more research to explore essential post-2012 issues. 
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3. From a national perspective, Norway should consider its interest in future negotiations. 
For instance, does Norway prefer to build on the global Kyoto structure or on a more 
regional approach involving the most willing nations? 
 
 
 
 
Samandrag 
Ny kreativitet er nødvendig for å vidareutvikle global klimapolitikk. Framtida til 
Kyotoprotokollen er usikker på grunn av den russiske nølinga med å ratifisere. Ifølgje 
Kyotoprotokollen skal forhandlingar om mål for perioden etter 2012 seinast starte opp i 2005, 
og vere ferdige innan utgangen av 2007. Dersom protokollen ikkje skulle tre i kraft vil det 
reise meir fundamentale spørsmål om utforming av internasjonale forhandlingar og former for 
internasjonalt klimapolitisk samarbeid. 
 
Denne studien gjev eit grunnlag for arbeidet med global klimapolitikk etter 2012 basert på eit 
omfattande gjennomgang av litteratur. Ei auka forståing for dei viktigaste spørsmåla, 
utfordringane, spørsmåla, løysingar foreslått så langt, og koplingar mellom desse spørsmåla er 
ein viktig føresetnad for denne prosessen. Den fyrste store utfordringa er å få til breiare 
deltaking i klimapolitikken, fyrst og fremst at utviklingslanda og USA blir med. Den andre 
store utfordringa er å få til omfattande reduksjonar i globale klimagassutslepp over dei neste 
tiåra for å unngå ei større menneskeskapt klimaendring. 
 
Denne oversiktsrapporten er inndelt i to hovuddelar basert på ei utvikling av klimapolitikken 
som startar med det langsiktige målet. Den fyrste delen drøftar langsiktige klimamål, medan 
den andre delen undersøkjer rammene for å gjennomføre klimapolitikken. Klimapolitikk bør 
nå miljømåla som er fastsett for den (oppnå større reduksjonar i globale utslepp av 
klimagassar), vere kostnadseffektiv, mogeleg å gjennomføre politisk (brei global deltaking), 
og mogeleg å forhandle om og gjennomføre. 
 
Ifølgje Klimakonvensjonen er det langsiktige målet for klimapolitikken å stabilisere 
konsentrasjonen av klimagassar i atmosfæren på eit nivå som hindrar ei farleg menneskeskapt 
forstyrring av klimasystemet (Artikkel 2). For å formulere ein praktisk klimapolitikk må dette 
generelle målet tolkast og spesifiserast. Sjølv om det kan sjå umogeleg ut å bli samde om eit 
langsiktig klimamål, og det er vanskeleg i vårt politiske system å binde seg til slike 
langsiktige mål, er det mange fordelar knytt til eit klårt mål. Eit langsiktig mål er eit 
utgangspunkt for kortsiktige mål og for vurdering av om ein er på veg til å oppnå målet, 
fremme teknologisk utvikling, og fremme merksemd om klimautfordringa og mobilisere 
samfunnet. Slike mål kan uttrykkjast som ein skranke på konsentrasjonen av klimagassar i 
atmosfæren, som er nært kopla til strålingspådrivet (’radiative forcing’), eller dei kan 
uttrykkjast i form av temperaturstigning. Alternativt kan dei uttrykkjast som skrankar på 
konsekvensar av klimaendring for økosystem og samfunn. Vi er mest opptekne av dei 
konkrete konsekvensane av klimaendring så dette alternativet ser ut til å vere det beste valet. 
På den andre sida er det mange vanskar knytt til dette alternativet, i form av kva indikatorar 
for klimaeffektar ein skal velje og korleis ein kan samanlikne effekten på ulike indikatorar og 
mellom land og regionar. Eit langsiktig klimamål må nåast gjennom ein utsleppsbane for 
klimagassar som svarar til målet, der eit val er om ein skal starte tidleg med omfattande 
reduksjonar av klimagassutsleppa eller vente med omfattande tiltak. 
 
Framtidige klimatiltak kan byggje på ulike rammeverk. Drøftinga i denne rapporten er 
strukturert rundt tre hierarkiske nivå. Det øvste nivået, arkitektur, viser til grunnleggjande 
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spørsmål i utforminga av global klimapolitikk, som om rammene heilt eller delvis skal vere 
FN-institusjonar som Klimakonvensjonen og Kyotoprotokollen. Andre grunnleggjande 
spørsmål er om ein skal sikte mot spesifikke kortsiktige utsleppsmål eller nøye seg med at 
utviklinga går i rett retning; om koordineringsnivået er globalt, regionalt, nasjonalt, eller 
sektorbasert; gruppering av land; og om ein skal opne for eit eller fleire klimapolitiske mål for 
eit og mellom land. Andre viktige spørsmål knytt til utforming av klimapolitiske rammer er 
samvirke mellom utvikling og klimapolitikk i utviklingsland, og korleis ein kan kombinere 
tiltak for klimagasskutt med tiltak for tilpassing til klimaendring. 
 
Det andre nivået gjeld ulike typar klimamål som land kan ta på seg. Vi drøftar ulike nasjonale 
klimamål som fører til reduserte klimagassutslepp. Det tredje og siste nivået ser på metodar 
for fordele utsleppskutta mellom land, på bakgrunn av eit eller fleire typar klimamål. Til slutt 
diskuterer vi kriterium som kan brukast til å evaluere metodar for fordeling av utsleppskutt 
mellom land. 
 
Dei viktigaste konklusjonane frå prosjektet er: 
 
1. Ei fleksibel tilnærming er nødvendig for å få til brei deltaking og omfattande reduksjonar i 
utsleppa av klimagassar. Fleksibiliteten bør gjelde på fire plan: val av type(ar) klimamål, 
metodar for fordeling av utsleppskutt mellom land, tidspunktet for når land (fyrst og fremst 
utviklingsland) skal ta på seg klimamål, og med omsyn på å ta med utslepp av substansar som 
har ein indirekte klimaeffekt. 
 
2. Framdrift i globale forhandlingar blir best sikra ved å fokusere på å gå in rett retning enn å 
oppnå kortsiktige globale utsleppsmål. 
 
3. Kostnader ved klimagasskutt og at det er attraktivt for land å delta må gjevast nok 
merksemd når ein skal samanlikna ulike utsleppsbaner som fører til det same globale målet 
uttrykt som ein skranke på temperaturstigninga i atmosfæren. 
 
4. Etter ei samla vurdering ser vi langsiktige mål basert på konsentrasjon og temperatur som 
betre eigna enn mål basert på effektar av klimaendringar. Men betre kunnskapar om 
fordelinga av effektar frå eit klimascenario over tid og rom vil vere eit verdifullt tilskot til 
utforming av utslepps-, konsentrasjons, og temperaturbaserte mål. 
 
5. Ein koalisjon av dei mest villige nasjonane kan vere eit interessant supplement til globale 
FN-baserte prosessar (som byggjer på Klimakonvensjonen og Kyotoprotokollen), og spesielt 
dersom Kyotoprotokollen skulle feile. 
 
6. Ein eller anna internasjonal koordinering av klimapolitikken er nødvendig for å sikre 
kostnadseffektivitet (og bruke fleksibilitetsmekanismane) og å gjere eit slikt samarbeid meir 
attraktivt gjennom brei internasjonal deltaking. Blir klimapolitikken meir kostnadseffektiv 
kan det bli mogeleg å nå meir ambisiøse mål. Nasjonane sin vilje og innsats for å forvalte 
klimasystemet som ein felles global ressurs avheng av innsatsen til alle nasjonar. 
 
I eit norsk perspektiv kunne den viktigaste medverknaden komme i tre kategoriar: 
 
1. Noreg kan prøve å minske den transatlantiske avstanden (mellom Europa og USA) og 
avstanden mellom fattige og rike land. I denne samanhengen kan Noreg byggje på gode 
relasjonar med mange utviklingsland gjennom utviklingsprosjekt. Det finst eit potensiale for 
betre integrasjon av berekraftig utvikling og klimapolitikk i utviklingspolitikken i fattige land 
og gjennom utviklingsprosjekt finansiert av rike land. Noreg kunne også hjelpe til med ein 
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betre integrasjon av tilpassing til klimaendringar og tiltak for å redusere utslepp av 
klimagassar. 
 
2. På bakgrunn av vår sterke tradisjon for klimaforsking kunne Noreg satse på meir forsking 
om post-2012 spørsmål. 
 
3. Ut frå eit nasjonalt perspektiv bør Noreg vurdere sin interesse i dei klimapolitiske 
forhandlingane som vil komme. For eksempel, vil Noreg helst byggje på den globale Kyoto-
strukturen eller ynskje ei meir regional tilnærming som involverer dei mest interesserte 
nasjonane? 
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1 Introduction  
Now is the time to think creatively about the future of global climate policy. The future of the 
Kyoto Protocol is uncertain due to Russian hesitation to ratify, which to a large degree is a 
consequence of American withdrawal in March 2001. Even if the Kyoto Protocol should be 
ratified by Russia and thus enter into force, negotiations on commitments for the next target 
period (after 2012) should, according to the protocol, at latest commence by 2005 and be 
finalized by end of 2007. 
 
The aim of this study is to provide an underpinning for this thinking and the formulation of 
future climate policy through a comprehensive survey of the literature. The paper is structured 
in a way that contributes to increased understanding of the main issues, challenges and 
questions, and examines how these issues are interlinked, and the solutions suggested so far. 
One major challenge is to induce broader participation in climate policy, foremost the 
involvement of developing countries and the USA. Another major challenge is depth in 
mitigation efforts, which refers to the necessity to achieve substantial reductions in global 
greenhouse gas emissions over the next decades to avoid a sizeable, and potentially 
dangerous, man-made climate change over this century.  
 
Figure 1.1 provides a schematic overview of the main stages and issues in the development of 
a global climate policy based on a well-defined long-term target. This structure is reflected in 
the main structure of this survey, but not necessarily in the treatment of the issues belonging 
to each box of the diagram. We find this top-down approach useful, but this does not imply 
that one must start with e.g. a long-term target before deciding on a future action architecture. 
Taking the Kyoto Protocol as an example, a short-term emission target was negotiated and 
differentiated across industrialized countries without any reference to a long-term target. This 
issue relates to a third major issue as part of designing global climate policy: Should the aim 
be to meet specific short-term emission or concentration targets, e.g. by 2030, or is a better 
way forward to focus on moving in the right direction (towards a long-term target)? 
 
The survey is divided into four main sections. It includes contributions from recent and 
ongoing projects at CICERO. A number of related issues are beyond the scope of the study 
and therefore not touched upon.1 Section 2 investigates long-term climate policy targets. 
Section 3 examines climate policy frameworks, and is divided into different approaches to 
future climate regimes (architectures), commitment types, and differentiation of 
commitments. Section 4 considers some related issues, and is followed by a discussion of the 
most interesting findings with regard to post-2012 issues in Section 5. Throughout the survey 
we have emphasized the inclusion of references to an extensive literature list, where the 
interested reader can seek out more detailed studies for further reading.  
 
                                                     
1 Examples of such issues include integration of other gases and particles (indirect climate gases and air 
pollutants) in climate policy, biotic sinks and underground storage of carbon dioxide, emissions from 
international ship freight and aviation, the relation between the trade regime (WTO) and the climate 
regime, and learning in terms of conveying new insights from research to applied policy design. 
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Figure 1.1 Main stages and issues in the development of global climate policy 
 
 
Medium-term, 
short-term 
targets 
 Concentration-based (emissions, concentrations, radiative forcing, 
temperature change, sea level rise) 
 Impacts-based (ecosystems, food production, economic development) 
 Emission path 
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2 Climate Policy Targets 
The ultimate objective of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) is “stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that 
would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system” (Article 2). 
However, there is no international consensus over the stabilisation level that may be required 
to avoid such damage, despite more than a decade of discussion in international negotiations 
and earlier scientific consideration of this issue. The difficulties are essentially twofold: 
impacts remain uncertain, and the concept of dangerous interference inevitably invokes value 
judgements. It is therefore hardly surprising that the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change (IPCC) has to date left discussion of the issue to the political rather than the scientific 
arena.  
 
Soon after the Kyoto Protocol was adopted in 1997, discussion of short-term issues, such as 
how its rules and structures might be revised, began to feature heavily in the international 
climate negotiations. Attempts to launch a formal review of commitments were initiated in 
1998, and then again at the Eighth Conference of the Parties (COP-8) in December 2002; 
however, they were met with little success. The most recent initiative at COP-8 was tabled by 
the European Union (EU) with the support of several Annex I countries,2 but was rejected by 
the Group of 77 (G-77) and the United States (US).3 
 
Traditionally, concentration levels of atmospheric CO2 (or greenhouse gases) have gained 
most attention when discussing avoiding “dangerous anthropogenic interference.”4 However, 
there are other factors that might be more appropriate indicators of climate change and thus 
more suitable as a basis for setting a long-term target (see Section 2.2).  
 
Drawing upon the latter part of the objective of the Convention (Article 2), attention has more 
recently focused on maximum acceptable or tolerable climate change based on impacts to 
ecology, the economy and society (see Hare 2003; WBGU 2003). This impacts-dimension is 
also mentioned in the objective of the Convention (Article 2) and could be a way of 
approaching the issue of a long-term target (see Section 2.2.1). As early as the late 1980s, 
such tolerable rates and thresholds as a driver for climate policies were discussed by the 
UNEP and WMO advisor to the UN Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases (UNAGGG) 
(Agrawala 1999; Corfee-Morlot and Höhne 2003:280), but they have only more recently been 
reintroduced in the context of a post-2012 climate regime. 
 
Another approach to setting long-term targets is founded on economic modelling, whereby 
GHG abatement and climate change damage functions are explicitly formulated to determine 
optimal mitigation in a cost-benefit setting. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) carry out such an 
analysis at the global regional level employing the RICE model. Obviously there are intrinsic 
uncertainties in such studies related to long-term scenarios for economic development, energy 
use and available energy sources, damage costs, and future mitigation costs, but over time 
these will be reduced as new knowledge on climate change impacts and other issues is gained. 
 
                                                     
2 Annex I is a list established under the UNFCCC of industrialised countries, including economies in 
transition, taking on specific emissions commitments. 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/glossary.htm 
3 The Group of 77 is the main negotiating group of developing countries within the UN system and 
represents more than 130 countries. http://europa.eu.int/comm/environment/climat/glossary.htm 
4 The Kyoto Protocol deals with the greenhouse gases carbon dioxide, nitrous oxide, methane, sulphur 
hexafluoride, hydrofluorocarbons and perfluorocarbons (IPCC 2001a). 
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In this section we first examine whether it is necessary to have an explicit long-term target, 
and what benefits and drawbacks a “top-down” approach involving a specified long-term 
target would provide. We then go on to review potential indicators for climate change, target 
levels and short-term emission paths consistent with a long-term target. 
2.1 A long-term target  
In this section we discuss whether a long-term target is necessary before we explore in more 
detail the rationale for developing and agreeing to a long-term target.  
 
2.1.1 Is a long-term target necessary? 
Even if Article 2 of the Framework Convention states that the ultimate objective is 
stabilization of CO2 concentration levels, the Kyoto Protocol negotiations did not consider, let 
alone agree upon, a long-term target. The Kyoto process has instead focused on setting short-
term targets (for Annex I parties), on the understanding that these will be subject to review 
and revision as time proceeds. As a result, some have described the current system as being 
characterized by “ad-hoc incrementalism” (Corfee-Morlot and Höhne 2003:280). Critics 
believe that setting a long-term target may help bring the negotiation process back on track. 
  
 
Figure 2.1: To stabilise concentrations at any level, emissions must ultimately fall to 
virtually zero. IS92a indicates the business-as-usual path, while the others indicate 
alternative paths to a future level of CO2-stabilization. Source: IPCC 2001b. 
 
Corfee-Morlot and Höhne (2003) propose that four major issues should be addressed when 
assessing the need for a long-term target. First, stabilisation of atmospheric concentrations in 
the 21st Century at any level would require a significant departure from current emission 
levels. Global emissions would need to drop radically compared to today, to well below 1990 
levels and decline to close to zero over time (see Figure 2.1). For example, to reach a certain 
stabilisation target of 450 ppmv,5 global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions would have to fall 
                                                     
5 For very small concentrations of gases, atmospheric scientists use the unit ppmv, which stands for 
parts per million by volume and represents the fraction of volume of gas occupied by a component 
multiplied by 1,000,000. If there is 3 ppm of CO2 in a bottle filled with gas, then for every 1,000,000 
molecules in the bottle, 3 of those molecules are CO2.  
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below 1990 by 2040 and peak by 2015 – perhaps even earlier (see Table 2.1). “The earlier the 
emissions peak and decline, the lower the stabilised concentration level, the lower the 
absolute level of climate change and the earlier that climate change is attenuated” (Corfee-
Morlot and Höhne 2003:278). 
 
Table 2.1 Level and timing of required global emission reductions. Source: IPCC 2001b, 
Table 6-1 
WRE* CO2 
stabilization 
profiles 
Accumulated CO2 
emissions 2001 to 
2100 (GtC) 
Year in which 
global emissions 
peak 
Year in which 
global emissions 
fall below 1990 level
450  365-735  2005-2015  <2000-2040  
550  590-1135  2020-2030  2030-2100  
650  735-1370  2030-2045  2055-2145  
750  820-1500  2040-2060  2080-2180  
1000  905-1620  2065-2090  2135-2270  
* WRE= Wigley, Richels and Edmonds. (1996).  
 
Second, they underline that there may be many different paths to a future stabilisation level of 
GHGs, and that there is a risk that if, in the short term, emissions rise above a certain level, 
low long-term stabilisation levels may be out of reach. Third, due to the inertia and delays in 
the climate system, even with stabilised concentrations, the world will still be committed to 
some significant climate changes for centuries to come. The longer mitigation is delayed, the 
longer the time period over which there will need to be a "commitment to climate change". 
Finally, they emphasise the rate of warming, which is important as it drives ecosystem 
impacts and possibly other effects such as non-linear, abrupt climate changes. 
  
2.1.2 The case for a long-term target 
This section discusses the arguments in favor of a long-term target that have been forwarded.  
 
Reviving the international climate negotiations 
Given the ease with which an incremental Kyoto-type process can be delayed and obstructed, 
a concerted international effort to achieve a consensus around an explicit long-term target 
might stimulate the international climate negotiations. The process of setting a long-term 
target could help the parties to lift their views and set focus on their common task in hand – to 
preserve a global public good for generations to come. It could also help the parties to shift 
their attentions away from individual near-term relative gains or costs, and instead put more 
emphasis on planning for a common future.  
A point of reference for determining short-term targets and assessing progress 
Pershing and Tudela argue that an explicit target for current and future actions would be 
valuable since, “it makes sense to know where you are going when starting a journey” 
(2003:13). A long-term commitment could also be more easily used as a basis for calibrating 
short-term measures and measuring progress (see Section 2.2.3). This standpoint is taken by 
the COOL-project (Climate OptiOns for the Long-term) at the National Institute for Public 
Health and the Environment (RIVM) in the Netherlands, which argues that a long-term target 
“would provide a clear reference for evaluating the adequacy of short-term climate policies” 
(Berk et al. 2001a:21). After all, “‘being on track’ can only be determined if the destination is 
known” (Pershing and Tudela 2003:14). Storey suggests that a long-term target is useful from 
both a research and a policy-making perspective, not only because a long-term target would 
provide a reference point from which to define short- and medium-term targets, but it might 
also improve the potential for cost-effective and fair implementation (since mitigation 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://calspace.ucsd.edu/virtualmuseum/Glossary_Climate/gloss_a-f.shtml 
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measures and projects need to be assessed over a longer time scale). Regular review of a 
tentative long-term concentration target could take place, which would provide the 
opportunity for later adjustments in light of the most recent scientific evidence and changes in 
social and political priorities (Berk et al. 2001a:21; Evans 2002:5; Storey 2002:20). A regular 
revision process would also be a way of ensuring that the parties are regularly committing to 
the long-term target. 
 
Learning about the limits of man-made interaction with the climate system 
Setting a long-term target can be a useful learning experience for researchers and decision 
makers involved since more insights in the climate effects of man-made emissions and the 
implications of various mitigation scenarios can be gained. Thus one can learn more about the 
limits put on human activities by the climate system.  
 
Addressing the risks of climate change 
Implicit in the process of setting a long-term target is that a decision is made regarding the 
‘acceptable’ level of risk. Establishing this level can help the international community come 
to terms with how to cope with the risks they face (Pershing and Tudela 2003) and consider 
how best to address the key issues of vulnerability and adaptation.  
Inducing technological change 
An explicit long-term target could induce technological change by providing a clear and stable 
signal to markets and, in doing so, encourage long-term investment in climate-friendly 
technologies (Pershing and Tudela 2003). For example, a clear target might have an impact on 
long-term investment planning. Would coal-based power plants still be a viable option if the 
Chinese knew that adjustment to a post-carbon economy was only a few decades away? 
Hasselman et al. underlines this argument, “although binding long-term commitments cannot 
be expected from governments, declarations of long-term policy goals and visible actions to 
achieve these goals are essential for the investment plans of businesses, particularly for energy 
technologies characterised by long capital lifetimes” (Hasselman et al. 2003:1924). 
Furthermore, they argue that while it is a natural response to uncertainty to take a step-by-step 
approach, the large reductions necessary to combat climate change require a long-term 
strategy and a broader spectrum of instruments. 
Promoting awareness and mobilizing society 
The process of setting a long-term target might improve awareness of climate change as an 
issue and strengthen the link in people’s minds between their actions today and their 
consequences tomorrow (Pershing and Tudela 2003). It may also broaden the support for 
near-term commitments and actions. In addition, the process of setting a long-term target 
could be a way of mobilizing society as a whole (business, industry, public sector, NGOs and 
individuals) to a much larger extent than the situation at present, where commitments are to a 
certain extent “taken care of” through more “abstract” means such as the flexibility 
mechanisms. A long-term target would provide legitimacy for climate mitigation action here 
and now – and not at some time and place in the future. 
Promoting global participation 
Pershing and Tudela (2003) claim that promoting global participation might be another 
rationale for a long-term target, because a stringent long-term target will require a global 
effort towards a climate goal. Watson also argues that a series of intermediate targets could be 
a way of involving developing countries in an equitable manner (Watson 2003:1926). 
 
2.1.3 Potential problems with a long-term target 
While few would disagree that there is a strong case for setting a long-term target in principle, 
various commentators have voiced their concern over the practical feasibility of agreeing on a 
long-term target in practice. We go on to discuss their reservations below.  
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From a theoretical point of view, it should be easier to agree upon a long-term than a short-
term target, as governments making far-sighted commitments today won’t be the ones held 
accountable if they are not fulfilled at some point in the distant future. According to the 
Roman principle of Justice, rebus sic stantibus, states have the right to break international 
agreements if their circumstances change (Hovi 1991, 1992, personal communication). A 
long-term climate target set for the next century would be subject to such uncertainties, and 
even if adopted might not be regarded as strictly binding. 
 
Even though Storey points at the usefulness of a long-term target, he underlines that: 
Achieving an international consensus on long-term stabilisation targets, however, will be 
very difficult to achieve at any point in the near future...what is considered to be a ‘safe’ level 
of climate change will vary widely between countries and regions. The more immediate and 
realistic task should instead be to develop some degree of international consensus around 
short and medium-term targets that keep future options open. Such short and medium-term 
targets will probably be expressed in terms of emissions rather than global concentrations of 
greenhouse gases. (Storey 2002:21, our emphasis). 
Pershing and Tudela (2003) also indicate some technical and political obstacles associated 
with setting a long-term target. They argue that the process will inevitably be confounded by 
scientific uncertainty, and as such, defining acceptable risk will be based on value judgment, 
rather than hard evidence. This could make an agreement complicated to negotiate. Moreover, 
such a process may divert what limited political will already exists away from mitigating 
climate change and meeting short-term targets, and play into the hands of those who are 
happy to stall the political process. The danger is therefore that rather than serving as a lever 
for action, a focus on the long term might end up “as an excuse for inaction.” 
Corfee-Morlot and Höhne also advocate a middle-way. They claim that it could be easier for 
the parties to agree upon “threshold levels for certain categories of impacts or of risks posed 
by climate change [which] could be translated into acceptable levels of atmospheric 
concentrations” (2003:277). Establishing a range of upper limits for global emissions in the 
medium term could help the parties set the ambition level for negotiations on stronger and 
broader GHG mitigation commitments in the near term.  
 
2.1.4 Alternatives to internationally negotiated targets 
Two alternative approaches to a global target have been suggested that could provide at least 
some of the benefits of a long-term climate target without requiring a formal goal to be 
negotiated at the international level: a hedging strategy, and the emergence of an informal 
target as a guide for action (Pershing and Tudela 2003:30-33).  
A hedging strategy 
This approach promotes near-term actions that leave open a range of future “targets” without 
necessarily requiring a commitment to any of them. It has been advocated by a variety of 
studies, most notably, the COOL dialogue and the German Advisory Council on Global 
Change (Berk 2001c; WBGU 2003; also see Section 2.2.3). A hedging strategy has the 
advantage of side-stepping the need to make any formal agreement on a specific long-term 
target, but poses a difficult political challenge because it requires more stringent long-term 
targets to be kept within reach, which is likely to require a considerable mitigation effort.  
An informal target 
It is conceivable that in the absence of an international consensus on the matter, an informal 
long-term target emerges that gradually becomes a guide for future climate change action. 
This could be the result of a regional initiative (e.g. by the EU) that spreads outwards to other 
countries as the need to meet the regional market’s stricter internal standards takes hold. 
Alternatively, one could envisage that the IPCC’s use of 550 ppmv as a standard value in its 
first report of 1991 implicitly becomes the basis for analysis and policymaking, without ever 
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forming the basis of an internationally negotiated agreement (even though this was not the 
original intention of the IPCC). 
2.2 Long-term climate target options  
In this section, we explore the potential forms that a global climate change target can take. 
Determining a long-term target ultimately poses three key challenges: (1) identifying an 
appropriate indicator of climate change; (2) selecting a suitable level for that indicator and 
timing for meeting this level, thereby selecting a target; and (3) choosing an emission path 
that is likely to lead to that designated target. This process is not only undermined by 
elements of uncertainty, but also invariably raises questions about costs, timing and political 
feasibility. We present a brief evaluation of the possible solutions to these problems, 
addressing each of these three central challenges in Sections 2.2.1, 2.2.2 and 2.2.3 
respectively. 
2.2.1 Indicators of climate change 
Figure 2.2 illustrates the way in which human activities interact with the climate system to 
cause climate change and its corresponding environmental, social and economic implications. 
Each step in the ‘cause-effect chain’ represents a stage at which a climate policy target could 
potentially be set. The benefit of using an indicator that is closer to the ‘effect’ end of the 
process is that it defines a target in the context of the damages it seeks to avoid (‘increasing 
relevance’ in the Figure 2.2).  
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Figure 2.2: Cause-effect chain from emissions to climate change and damages   
Source: Adapted from Fuglestvedt et al. 2003 
 
The drawback, on the other hand, is that with every progressive step in the chain, there is an 
increasing amount of uncertainty resulting from an additional stage in the calculation - not to 
mention a longer time lag. In addition to the criteria of closeness to impacts and certainty, a 
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UNFCCC (2002) report proposes that a climate indicator should be understandable to both 
scientists and the public.6  
We proceed with a brief examination of the relative merits of the main indicators. 
Emissions 
This is the short-term indicator currently employed by the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC, 
which commits developed countries to reducing greenhouse gases outputs (measured in CO2 
equivalents) by an average of five per cent from 1990 levels between 2008 and 2012. In 
addition, the UK government has made a long-term commitment to reduce CO2 emissions by 
60 per cent by 2050, and the Swedish government has pledged to cut emissions by 46 per cent 
by 2050.7 The case for setting emissions as a climate change indicator is, first, that it is 
understood to be the cause of climate change; second, that domestic emissions lie within the 
legal jurisdiction of national governments; third, and finally that the IPCC methodology for 
emission inventories is already in place. Furthermore, uncertainty is comparatively low 
because emissions sit high in the ‘climate change chain’ and emissions targets are easily 
understandable (UNFCCC 2002:10). On the downside, an emissions indicator is far removed 
from climate impacts.   
Concentration 
“Stabilisation of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere” is the ultimate objective of 
the UNFCCC. The choice of this indicator represents a political consensus reached at the end 
of an arduous negotiation process, which potentially makes this the most politically viable 
option (Pershing and Tudela 2003:22). Other advantages are that it is understandable, 
certainty is relatively high, it is closer to impacts than emissions (UNFCCC 2002:10), and it 
captures cumulative rather than simply marginal change (Pershing and Tudela 2003:22). This 
approach also leaves room for including substances in addition to those included among the 
six Kyoto gases – such as ozone precursors and aerosols – that also have a climate effect. The 
inclusion of these substances would increase mitigation flexibility and could enhance the 
cost-effectiveness of climate policy, but on the other hand the complexity in negotiations and 
implementation of mitigation measures would increase (Rypdal et al. 2004). 
Radiative forcing8 
Using radiative forcing as a metric of climate change has been explored in detail by studies 
such as Fuglestvedt et al. (2003). This approach is currently used in the Kyoto Protocol 
through the Global Warming Potential (GWP) metric, which compares the integrated 
radiative forcing of a pulse emission of a climate gas for a specific time horizon. CO2 is taken 
as the reference gas, so that the effects of other GHGs are expressed in CO2 equivalents. This 
makes the climate effects of various GHGs comparable and a comprehensive “basket” 
approach across the six Kyoto Protocol gases possible. Thus countries can choose to 
implement their Kyoto target as an abatement mix from a menu of gases. 
Temperature change and sea level rise  
Temperature increase and, to a greater extent, sea level rise (SLR) are indicators with added 
uncertainties compared to radiative forcing. As seen from Figure 2.3 they are characterised by 
very long time-lags. While their effects are felt globally, warming will have more severe 
effects on some regions than others, for example, temperature is predicted to rise faster in the 
Polar Regions, and low-lying small island states are likely to suffer the most from sea level 
rise. Nevertheless, it is important to remember that temperature change and sea level rise are 
                                                     
6 This report focuses on the scientific and methodological aspects of the Brazilian Proposal for 
differentiation of commitments to reduce GHG emissions, see section 3.3.3. 
7 The Swedish target is defined as reducing per capita emissions from the present level of 8.3 tons of 
CO2 equivalents per capita to 4.5 tons by 2050, and continued reductions thereafter.  
8 Radiative forcing is the change in radiative budget of the surface-troposphere system following a 
pertuberation to an atmospheric trace constituent (Fuglestvedt et al. 2003). 
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the impacts we are essentially concerned about. The rate of change (usually given per decade) 
is also a factor to bear in mind, as rapid changes can impair the adaptive capacity of species 
and increase the risk of large-scale singular events (WBGU 1995, 1997, 2003). Temperature 
increase and/or rate of change are indicators that have been proposed by the EU, national 
governments (e.g. the Dutch government and the Brazilian government during the Kyoto 
negotiations) and researchers (e.g. UNAGGG 1990; WGBU 1995, 2003; Torvanger et al. 
2004). The UN Advisory Group on Greenhouse Gases has also published targets based on sea 
level rise and rate of sea level rise (UNAGGG 1990).  
 
 
Figure 2.3: The time-lag between CO2 emissions, atmospheric concentrations 
stabilization, surface air temperature continues to rise slowly for a century or more. 
Source: SPM-5: IPCC 20019  
Indicators based on impacts 
As already mentioned, Article 2 of the UNFCCC emphasizes that climate change actions 
should take place “within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to 
climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic 
development to proceed in a sustainable manner” (UNFCCC 1992, our emphasis).10 Studies 
have responded to this challenge by proposing targets on the basis of their ability to safeguard 
against ‘unacceptable’ climate change damage using indicators such as coral reef damage, 
disintegration of the West Antarctic Ice Sheet (WAIS) and thermohaline circulation (THC) 
shutdown (O’Neill and Oppenheimer 2002); the number of additional people placed at 
increased risk (Parry et al. 2001); and decline in European ecosystem productivity (van 
Minnen et al. 2002). More ambitious assessments examine the implications of climate change 
for a broad range of sectors, spanning two or more of the three areas mentioned in Article 2 
(Arnell et al. 2002; Hare 2003; WGBU 2003). 
                                                     
9 http://www.grida.no/climate/ipcc_tar/vol4/english/012.htm#figspm5 
10 Sulphur emissions causing acid precipitation is one example of successfully developed consensus 
around a level of critical load. These emissions are regulated through the Gothenburg Protocol under 
the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution (LRTAP). 
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Impacts-based climate targets are typically calculated using a ‘back-tracking’ methodology 
whereby the critical tolerance limits for specific climate-sensitive indicators are identified and 
the temperature change or GHG concentration level expected to correspond to this limit is 
calculated. This approach has two main drawbacks that would make framing a long-term 
climate goal in these terms problematic. The first is that choosing an indicator, or even a 
selection of indicators out of an infinite number of possible indicators, inevitably involves 
making a value judgment, which is likely to make reaching a consensus difficult. The second 
is that it assumes that there is an explicit level of comparability between indicators, which is 
also a somewhat contentious proposal. Otherwise the best scientists can do is to present a 
matrix of indicators and impacts, with a geographical dimension, and leave all comparisons to 
decision makers. A possible way of overcoming these problems could be to use impacts-
based indicators as a climate policy tool rather than as a long-term target in itself. For 
example, if a matrix incorporating emissions levels and their related regional impacts could 
be compiled (and this is perhaps a big if), it could be used to identify the most vulnerable 
regions and likely impacts given a climate change scenario, and therefore either form a basis 
for setting a global allowable emissions target or provide a means for encouraging 
participation in a global climate policy regime. While impacts-based targets score highly on 
account of their closeness to society and ecosystems, they fare poorly in terms of certainty 
and political feasibility. 
 
2.2.2 Target: choosing indicator level and timing  
Discussion of long-term climate target levels must necessarily take place within the context of 
specific climate change indicators. In line with UNFCCC objectives, the majority of the 
literature and government policy has presented targets in terms of either atmospheric 
concentrations of greenhouse gases or temperature change. We now turn our attention to these 
indicators. Table 2.2 provides a summary of some of the targets and levels that have been 
proposed in recent years. These options have been divided into two categories: concentration 
and temperature-based targets and impacts-based targets (see section 2.2.1).   
Table 2.2: Summary of proposed targets 
Study Concentration and temperature-based targets 
Enquette Kommission (1991) +2°C; maximum rate of increase 0.1°C/decade 
WBGU (1995) +0.2°C/decade 
European Commission (1996) +2°C; 550 ppmv CO2 should “guide reductions” 
Azar and Rodhe (1997) +2°C is a ‘critical level’; 350-400ppmv CO2 stabilisation 
Klimatkommiten, Sweden 
(2000) 
550ppmv stabilisation of six KP GHGs by 2050 (500ppmv CO2 equivalent) 
UK Government (DEFRA 
2003) 
550ppmv stabilisation of six KP GHGs (500ppmv CO2 equivalent) 
WBGU (2003) +2°C; maximum rate of +0.2°C/decade (also examines implications in terms of impacts) 
Torvanger et al. (2004) +2.5°C 
 Impacts-based targets 
UN Advisory Group on GHGs 
(1990) 
30cm SLR from 1990; +3cm/decade; limit of +1-2°C; +0.1-0.2°C/decade  
Parry et al. (2001) Examines risk to humans - 450ppmv CO2 would “achieve very great reductions” 
O’Neill and Oppenheimer 
(2002) 
WAIS destruction + THC shutdown, but not coral damage, may be prevented at 
450ppmv CO2  
Arnell et al. (2002) Investigates impacts to eight indicators and concludes that a limit of 550ppmv CO2 is 
“necessary to avoid…most of the projected impacts”  
van Minnen et al. (2002) Finds that even at 450ppmv CO2, impacts could exceed ‘critical’ levels in 9-13% of 
Europe 
Hare (2003) +1-2°C leads to a significant increase in risk; “above 2°C the risks increase very 
substantially involving potentially large extinctions or even ecosystem collapses” 
Key: KP = Kyoto Protocol; SLR = sea level rise; WAIS = West Antarctic Ice Sheet; THC = Thermohaline Circulation. 
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The former group of proposals consists of political commitments (i.e. from the EU, and the 
Swedish and UK governments), and a body of literature which largely uses historical climate 
variations as a basis for target level-setting (e.g. WGBU 2003 investigate observed variations 
in global mean temperature over the last several hundred thousand years and set a future 
target level they estimate will not stretch the earth beyond its adaptive capacity). 
2.2.3 Setting emissions paths   
Whether or not the international community manages to agree on a long-term target, it will 
need to consider which global and national emissions paths it believes should be followed in 
the short-term. While Section 3.3 discusses how commitments may be distributed 
internationally, in this section we investigate how an international near-term target may be 
determined, either within the context of a long-term target or in its absence. As there are an 
almost infinite number of possibilities, each with its own economic and political implications, 
the major challenge is to identify an option that is both acceptable to all parties and 
environmentally sound. Figure 2.4 demonstrates how wide the range of potential paths that 
may lead to a long-term target is. The graph on the left-hand side illustrates a range of CO2 
emissions paths that are compatible with (a) the Kyoto Protocol (dark grey triangle), and (b) 
the various baselines explored by the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES) of the 
IPCC (lighter shaded area). The figure to the right shows how wide possible CO2 pathways 
leading to a target may be: the paths shaded in the top right-hand side of the diagram illustrate 
potential routes leading to stabilisation at 550 ppmv, and the lower shaded area shows ways in 
which an upper concentration limit of 450 ppmv may be reached. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Possible global CO2 emissions pathways to 2020 (left); Possible global 
emission stabilisation pathways 2000-2040 (right). Source: Morita et al. 2001 in Corfee-
Morlot and Höhne 2003:287   
 
Central to the discussion about how to set short-term emissions paths (potentially leading to a 
long-term target) is the issue of timing. Should actions to mitigate climate change emphasise 
near-term actions or can the thrust of the effort be deferred to a later date when the 
uncertainties about climate impacts have been reduced? The remainder of this section focuses 
on addressing these questions. It begins with the case for delayed action and proceeds with 
arguments for early action. 
The case for delayed action 
In the face of uncertainty, it can be argued that it is prudent to adopt a ‘wait and see’ 
approach. First and foremost, the economic literature has traditionally favoured delayed 
action. Research into ‘least cost pathways,’ which attempts to identify the most cost-effective 
path to reaching a given long-term target, has tended to report that modest early action 
followed by (rapid) later action incurs the lowest overall cost (Wigley, Richels and Edmunds 
1996; OECD 1999). This is largely because technological advancement is expected to bring 
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down the cost of undertaking emissions reductions in the future. Over time learning about 
consequences of climate change and new technologies means that uncertainty is reduced, 
which provides a better information platform for efficient policies. Aaheim et al. (2001) show 
that such uncertainty can be best handled through a long-term policy directed towards carbon 
dioxide reductions (which are long-lived), whereas methane reductions (which are short-
lived) should be used to manage shorter-term fluctuations in atmospheric concentrations and 
be kept as a reserve to be used if it turns out that stricter and faster working measures are 
needed. 
 
An emphasis on delayed action may also secure broader political support for short-term 
initiatives. Implementing only gradual reductions until more concrete evidence of the link 
between greenhouse gases emissions and their impacts is available may bring on board 
reluctant (but important) actors, such as Bush, who currently question the scientific basis for 
global warming (Taylor 2002).   
The argument for early action  
Conversely, the fact that knowledge about the future impacts of climate change is uncertain 
can be seen as a strong argument for early action. Taking precautionary measures, as 
advocated by Article 3.3 of the UNFCCC, may prevent the climate system from crossing 
critical thresholds early on that could cause irreversible damage to ecosystems and 
humankind (Smith 2003). The idea of ‘keeping options for the long-term open’ has been the 
subject of several studies, most notably, the COOL project (Berk 2001c). This international 
dialogue proposes that short-term targets are set with the ultimate objective of keeping low 
long-term stabilisation goals within reach in case new information should emerge to suggest 
that this is desirable (also see Azar and Rodhe 1997; Toth and Mwandosya 2001; Corfee-
Morlot and Höhne 2003). The ‘Tolerable Windows Approach’ takes a similar standpoint. 
Developed by the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU 1995, 1997, 2003), it 
sets defined constraints or ‘guardrails’ that exclude both ‘intolerable climate change’ and 
unacceptable mitigation measures, and proposes that short-term targets be determined within 
this corridor (Bruckner et al. 1999). 
Early action is likely to be advantageous for environmental, political and economic reasons 
(Storey 2002:22-5). Taking environmental considerations first, implementing more stringent 
targets early on is likely to lead to a slower temperature rise, which may buy time for humans 
and other species to adapt to climate change.   
In political terms, delaying action presupposes that making more significant cuts at some 
point in the future will be politically feasible. However, this cannot be guaranteed and 
introduces a risk that no concerted action will be taken at all. Delayed action also raises 
intergenerational issues and runs contrary to Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC, which states that 
“the Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations, on the basis of equity” (our emphasis). 
While conventional economic thinking suggests that delayed rather than early action is more 
cost-effective, many economic models producing these results have been criticised for their 
handling of technological change. Traditional methodology treats technological change as 
exogenous. However, this assumption has been questioned by the Porter Hypothesis, which 
suggests that environmental regulations can stimulate innovation and drive costs down faster 
than would have been the case otherwise (Porter and van der Linde 1995). Models applying 
this hypothesis refer to this effect as ‘induced technical change’ and tend to conclude that the 
abatement costs associated with early action might not be as high as previously predicted 
(Storey 2002:24-5). 
In sum, if abiding by the precautionary principle, uncertainty with regard to both economic 
opinion and knowledge about future climate impacts suggests that it may be advisable for the 
international community to undertake short- and medium-term actions that keep future 
options open.   
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3 Climate policy frameworks 
What will be the best basis for future action? In this chapter we would first like to examine 
different frameworks for future commitments. The discussion is structured around three levels 
organized in a hierarchical manner. The highest level relates to the architecture of future 
actions. Architecture refers to fundamental decisions in the design of global climate policy, 
such as the following: whether or not the policy fully or in part builds on United Nations 
(UN) institutions such as the Climate Convention (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto Protocol; 
whether it aims for a specific long-term target, short-term emission targets or rather aims to 
implement measures that move us in the right direction through reduced global emissions; the 
coordination level of the policy; grouping of countries; and choice of level of heterogeneity of 
commitments both within nations (e.g. more than one commitment type possible for each 
nation) and between nations. Other fundamental issues for global climate policy design are 
integrating development and climate policy in poor countries, and combining emissions 
abatement with adaptation to climate change. However, these issues are outside of the scope 
of this survey. The second level is represented by climate policy commitment types. We 
present different types of commitments that all could contribute to reduced emissions, but in 
different ways (Section 3.2). The third level relates to various ways of differentiating such 
commitments, given that one or more commitment types have been selected (Section 3.3). 
Lastly, we discuss criteria that are useful for assessing these schemes (Section 3.4).   
 
3.1 Architecture of future actions 
In this section we first discuss to what extent future climate policy should be framed under the 
United Nations’ institutions, the UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
3.1.1 The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
The UNFCCC has entered into force and provides a general basis for global climate policy 
efforts. A long-term target specified in Article 2 is adopted, but only formulated in general 
terms. Furthermore it commits countries to reporting emissions and climate policy measures 
using a common format. However, climate policy developed under UNFCCC is based on 
participation of all nations and unanimous decisions. This means that single nations opposing 
such initiatives have many opportunities to block progress. Thus some authors propose 
alternative processes that could supplement this UN process and make more progress 
possible. One such idea is for the keenest parties to join in some kind of “coalition of the 
willing” and agree upon a framework and commitments for the post-2012 period. Such a 
coalition could to a large extent be regional and, for example, include the EU, other European 
countries, Canada, Japan, and the most interested developing countries (Bodansky 2003). The 
Global Commons Institute and more recently the WBGU have proposed the launch of a 
Global Climate Community of core states (the EU, some industrialized states and developing 
countries) which they propose should adopt emissions reductions according to the contraction 
and convergence principle (WBGU 2003:58). Another idea is to negotiate a separate protocol 
on impacts and adaptation under the UNFCCC (Müller 2002c), which would faciliatate a 
more active participation by developing countries in both adaptation efforts and emission 
abatement efforts (see section 4.1).  
 
3.1.2 The Kyoto Protocol 
It is still uncertain whether and when the Kyoto Protocol will enter into force. The outcome 
depends solely on Russian ratification. In any case there are important reasons for considering 
to what extent post-2012 climate policy should build upon the Kyoto Protocol structure. 
 
The main argument for building on the Kyoto Protocol is that is represents a huge political 
and intellectual effort of over six years of intense international negotiations. During this 
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period numerous proposals and options have been assessed, discussed and refined. The 180 
Parties to the UNFCCC that took part in the negotiations have managed to agree and build 
bridges across disparate and diverse values, interests, views and levels of understanding. As 
Grubb et al. states, “such achievement should not be lightly discarded.” (Grubb et al. 
2001:13). The most valuable features of the Kyoto Protocol are specified and legally binding 
commitments for industrialized countries to reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases, 
differentiated commitments, and flexibility both with respect to greenhouse gases (a 
comprehensive approach containing a basket of six gases) and with respect to where 
emissions are abated through the three flexibility mechanisms. The six gases basket approach 
and the flexibility mechanisms enhance the attainable level of national and international cost-
effectiveness. In our literature survey, there seems to be broad support for building upon the 
Kyoto structure (Pershing 2003; WBGU 2003). The Kyoto structure may also be a basis for a 
future regime, albeit one that must be adjusted or reformed to take into account broader 
participation and stronger commitments. Berk and den Elzen (2004) discuss potential ways to 
salvage the Protocol should Russia fail to ratify. They evaluate alternatives such as relaxing 
Kyoto targets, amending the 55 per cent requirement (for Kyoto to come into force), 
implementing targets without ratifying, extending the role of the CDM, and developing an 
improved CDM that could function outside the Kyoto Protocol. These modifications, 
however, would lead to narrower participation and weaker commitments, and may serve to 
undermine the core features of the Protocol. Furthermore, the authors warn that some of these 
amendments may encounter major practical and/or legal problems. 
 
The main criticisms of the Kyoto Protocol are limited participation (no commitments for 
developing countries), the lack of linkage between short-term targets and a long-term target, 
the absence of a clear and transparent methodology to differentiate commitments, a weak 
enforcement system, insufficient attention to adaptation as a policy alternative, and uncertain 
compliance costs (Berk et al. 2001a:15; Barrett 2003; Tonn 2003). Barrett (2003) is a 
particularly vocal critic of the Kyoto Protocol, and argues that the treaty is fundamentally 
flawed due to its weak compliance mechanism and failure to provide a structure for extending 
the breadth and depth of cooperation over time (2003). Cost and uncertainty are the main 
obstacles for broader participation and more stringent commitments. Addressing these 
obstacles is the best possible incentive to engage developing countries. 
 
3.1.3 Specific short-term targets or just a long-term goal 
Even if a global climate policy agreement aims at a long-term target, for example, a 
maximum allowable temperature change by 2100, the agreement does not necessarily have to 
specify short-term targets in terms of e.g. allowable global emissions by 2020. The alternative 
is to be more concerned with moving in the right direction, that is, abatement of emissions 
and implementing measures accordingly. An illustration of this is the difference between a tax 
on GHG emissions and an emissions trading system based on a cap on GHG emissions. 
Introducing a tax will reduce emissions, but we have no way of knowing in advance how fast 
and how big the effect will be. Of course, the tax level can be adjusted at a later date when 
more is understood about its potential effects. The important question to ask is whether it 
would be helpful for the development of global climate policy if actions are more focused on 
moving in the right direction than on meeting specific short-term emission targets. 
 
3.1.4 Coordination level: global, regional, national or sectoral? 
Climate policy is about the management of a global public good, which we may call a stable 
climate system. To induce broad participation and avoid free-rider problems, as well as to 
enhance cost-effectiveness, a climate policy should be coordinated. Since this is a global 
problem, it makes intuitive sense that coordination be undertaken at the global level, which is 
also the major reasoning for developing the UN-based regime represented by the UNFCCC 
and the Kyoto Protocol. 
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If the global approach faces large problems, an alternative is coordination of policy at a 
regional level. Coordination in Europe and in particular through the European Union (EU) is 
the most likely regional arena for such an agreement: Also other industrialized countries 
might be participants (e.g. Japan, Canada and New Zealand). An internal redistribution of 
EU’s Kyoto commitments was already in place before the Kyoto negotiations (Article 4). The 
EU has already developed a relatively common climate policy, but further development of 
domestic policies and measures (PAMs), such as product standards, taxes and research, will 
continue. Furthermore, the EU has developed its own emissions trading scheme for the period 
2005-2007, and could be willing to sustain and develop this further even if the Kyoto Protocol 
fails to enter into force. Also, global and regional agreements might reinforce and strengthen 
each other. Bretteville et al. (2003) argue that despite the fact that the climate change problem 
is global, it might be better dealt with through regional cooperation than through a global 
treaty. Rypdal et al. (2004) find that some indirect GHGs (such as ozone precursors) and 
aerosols best can be regulated through regional agreements with links to a global climate 
agreement. Regional agreements may be the appropriate level to regulate emission sources 
responsible both for emissions of GHGs and air pollutants (Holloway et al. 2003). In Europe 
some of these substances (causing acid precipitation) are regulated through the Gothenburg 
Protocol under the LRTAP convention. 
 
Next, coordination could be international but sector-based. Thus, for example, measures to 
reduce GHG emissions from the aviation industry could be globally coordinated to give all 
airlines stronger incentives to participate and to abate emissions in a cost-effective manner, 
and also to avoid leakages if only parts of the industry is regulated. On the other hand, a large 
cost-saving potential would be forgone if climate policies should not be coordinated across 
different sectors. 
 
Finally, coordination can take place at the national level, whereby a national target can be met 
in a cost-effective manner. Obviously unilateral and uncoordinated national policies will be a 
very inefficient response to climate change as a global problem, and incentives for free-riding 
will be substantial. 
 
3.1.5 Grouping and participation of countries 
A major issue in designing climate policy agreements is differentiation in space and time, that 
is, in terms of grouping of nations and in terms of what year or period commitments will be 
associated with.  
 
Under the UNFCCC, all Parties have already certain general commitments, such as preparing 
national inventories of greenhouse gas emissions, implementing policies and measures, and 
cooperating in preparation for adaptation to the impacts of climate change. As the Convention 
builds upon the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and capabilities of 
Parties, the Parties are divided into three groups for the purpose of differentiating 
commitments, see Figure 3.1:  
• Parties included in Annex II to the Convention encompass the countries that were 
members of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
in 1992. 
• Parties included in Annex I to the Convention (Annex I Parties) encompass both the 
countries that were members of the OECD in 1992, and countries with "economies in 
transition" (EITs), that is, the Russian Federation and other Central and Eastern 
European countries. 
• Parties not included in Annex I to the Convention (Non-Annex I Parties) encompass 
those countries that are not members of Annex I, including all newly industrialized 
countries and developing countries. 
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Figure 3.1 Country groups (Höhne et al. 2003:4)  
 
The division between Annex I and Non-Annex I Parties has developed into a very rigid divide 
which has been further reinforced by the Kyoto Protocol: The Annex I Parties are committed 
to absolute targets or emissions caps, while the large and heterogeneous group of Non-Annex 
I Parties are without any emissions commitments.  
 
In future agreements, it is a likely option that the Parties, particularly the Non-Annex I 
parties, are differentiated and split in different groups. Such grouping for the purpose of 
differentiation of commitments could be based on a given indicator or a combination of 
several, such as emissions per capita, GDP per capita, human development index, total 
emissions, or historical responsibility for temperature change (Claussen and McNeilly 1998; 
Bodansky 2003). 
 
Participation thresholds 
The most contentious future negotiation issue seems to be which Parties should be subject to 
commitments. One option is that all countries participate, as advocated by Schmalensee 
(1996, 1998); for example, some could have absolute emissions caps, while others may have 
indexed emission caps which are growth- or intensity-based (Stavins 2001, also see Section 
3.2).11 Participation could also be voluntary such as the Kazakhstan case, but the commitment 
becomes binding once agreed by the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC. Otherwise, a 
Party can also be subject to commitments defined by a threshold for participation.  
 
Such a participation threshold would in practice mean that all those countries whose e.g. 
emissions per capita are above a certain level have to participate and take on some sort of 
commitment. There are numerous proposals and attempts to classify, group or regroup the 
parties (e.g. Claussen and McNeilly 1998, Gupta 1998; Storey 2002; Höhne et al. 2003; 
Bodansky 2003). There could be different indicators and thresholds of participation in an 
                                                     
11 Indexed emission caps are alternatively named relative or dynamic emission caps. 
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agreement or protocols to a future climate regime. Table 3.1 shows the proposal by Storey 
2002 as an example. Based on a mix of criteria of capacity and opportunity, he proposes 
dividing the developing countries into four groups with different levels of responsibility or 
commitments (stages).   
Table 3.1: Storey’s proposed framework for the future (Storey 2002:33) 
 
‘Increasing participation’ or multi-stage approaches have been developed by Gupta (1998), 
Stewart and Wiener (2001) and den Elzen et al. (2001). “The aim with such a system is to 
ensure that countries with comparative circumstances in economic, developmental and 
environmental terms have comparative responsibilities/commitments under the climate 
regime. Moreover, the system defines when their level of responsibility/commitment change 
as their circumstances change” (Berk et al. 2001a:29). Another grouping of parties is based on 
Gupta (1998) and has been used in the COOL-project’s Multi-stage approach. The parties 
may be grouped according to mainly economic criteria and emissions levels. Gupta proposed 
a categorisation of five different groups that have different commitments depending on their 
capabilities: less-developed countries (LDCs including AOSIS) with low emissions; LDCs 
(including AOSIS); MIC – middle-income developing countries; and high-income developing 
countries (HIDC) (Gupta 1998).12  In addition, Stewart and Wiener (2001) aim to promote 
developing country participation by using four instruments that are compatible with a Kyoto 
framework: (1) a simplified CDM, (2) voluntary participation in emissions trading without 
quotas, (3) voluntary entry into a quota system, (4) accession to an emissions quota system 
once a specified level of GDP per capita has been reached. 
 
3.1.6 Homogenous or heterogeneous actions 
In terms of differentiation and grouping across parties, even actions or tasks each group 
undertakes could be heterogeneous (Hahn 1998). In the Kyoto Protocol, Annex I Parties are 
all subject to homogenous actions. They are committed to reducing or limiting their emissions 
of GHGs for a fixed time period. In a future regime, this approach could either be mixed with 
or even totally substituted by other different types of actions or commitments. 
 
The most likely option is that different countries or groups are committed to different types of 
actions or commitments. In a future regime, the commitments could be heterogeneous in both 
what kind of actions or targets the parties are subject to and when they have to/should comply 
with it. Also parties within a group might be subject to heterogeneous actions, for instance 
various LDCs could propose different voluntarily initiatives or optional commitments. 
 
Regarding different commitments, countries could agree on a set of legitimate commitment 
types – a “menu” (see Section 3.2 for a discussion of commitment types). Then each country 
                                                     
12 AOSIS is the Alliance Of Small Island States. 
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is free to choose one or more of these options as a basis for their climate policy, see Figure 
3.2 for an illustration. In this illustration, Non-Annex I countries (developing countries) are 
assumed to find indexed (intensity-based) emission caps and technology programs attractive 
(see section 3.2). The last step would be to agree on how much a country should do under 
each commitment type. One challenge of such an approach is to compare efforts under 
different commitment types and how much each contributes to reaching e.g. a common GHG 
concentration target in the atmosphere. 
 
KP + Intensity
TechnologyPollution and 
climate
The EU
Non Annex I
Illustration of national portfolios of commitment 
types
The USA
Russia
 
Figure 3.2: An illustration of heterogeneous commitment types 
3.2 Commitment types 
A key element of a future climate framework will be what type of commitment structure to 
employ.13 There could for example be a whole menu of different types of commitments that 
the parties may choose from. The nature of the climate change problem as a classic global 
public good that is vulnerable to free riding, as well as the history of international 
environmental cooperation, implies the need for binding commitments. Experience has shown 
that voluntary measures only achieve limited emission mitigation efforts, and are not likely to 
result in the significant emission reductions needed to control man-made global warming 
(confer section 2.2.3).14 
  
There are huge differences between countries in terms of development level, technology, 
energy system, population size, economic structure, resource base, etc. Thus, allowing 
countries to fulfil their commitments in various ways which take national circumstances into 
consideration would enhance both the attractiveness of climate policy and cost-effectiveness. 
Presenting a menu or a variety of different types of commitment may be a vital move to 
broaden participation and encourage the parties to take upon stronger commitments. As this 
section will illustrate, there are a variety of different types of commitments and numerous 
ways of combining them, and among them voluntarily commitments may certainly play an 
important role. However, up to now, quantified emission limitation targets have been the 
                                                     
13 Climate change negotiations have focused on “commitments,” i.e. requirements that a state itself 
assumes, rather than on “obligations,” a broader term that includes norms externally imposed 
(Bodansky 2003). By making a commitment to reduce GHG emissions, a state agrees to limit its future 
freedom of action; it promises to behave in a certain way or to achieve a certain result. While its 
acceptance of a commitment is voluntary, its fulfilment of the commitment is not. 
14 One example of this is the recommendation in the UNFCCC that industrialized countries should 
stabilize their GHG emissions at 1990 level by 2000, which very few countries were able to meet. 
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principal type of climate commitment. In the Kyoto Protocol, the targets are fixed, pegged to 
historical emission levels. The question is, should we continue in that direction, or would 
another approach be more expedient? Different types of targets may complement or even 
replace the Kyoto commitments. In the following section we will present the main types of 
and dimensions of climate commitments. 
 
The content of a commitment has both formal (binding vs. non-binding) and substantive 
dimensions. There are a variety of possible future mitigation commitments, including 
quantified and non-quantified objectives. Pershing (2003) suggests four main paths for post 
2012 climate policy, which probably should be combined: a Kyoto-like structure; technology; 
development first; and bilateral or regional approaches. Storey (2002) sees five alternatives to 
the Kyoto Protocol: coordinated policies and measures; non-binding targets; price-based 
commitments; price cap proposals; and indexed (and intensity) targets. Another reference is 
Höhne et al. (2003), who presents numerous alternative approaches to a future climate 
framework: continuing Kyoto; indexed targets; contraction and convergence; global Triptych; 
multi-sector or “bottom-up” approaches; equal mitigation costs; multi-stage approach (FAIR); 
and coordinated policies & measures. 
 
From these and other references the major broad categories of commitment types can be 
described as follows: 
 
 Absolute emissions-based cap 
 Indexed emissions-based cap 
 Financial support 
 Policies and measures 
 
Thus the parties in a climate regime could be committed to not only reducing GHGs, but also 
to providing financial contributions to the climate funds and to implementing various policies 
and measures, including technology standards, incentives for further research and 
development of cleaner (energy) technology, use of taxes, and removal of subsidies. 
 
3.2.1 Binding vs. non-binding commitments 
A hot topic at particularly COP7 in Marrakech and a regular issue of discussion in the climate 
change negotiations is the parties’ level of commitment: should these commitments be 
binding or non-binding? Non-binding commitments would reduce cost uncertainty. They may 
take a form similar to that adopted in the UNFCCC, where Annex I Parties were to “aim” to 
return emissions to 1990 levels. However, there would be no penalties for exceeding the goal. 
This option is essentially similar to the price cap option, in which the price is set to zero. Even 
non-binding targets may – through emissions trading – provide an incentive for emission 
reductions. Sales could occur if emissions are less than the targets. The primary problem with 
the non-binding target option lies in the limited certainty it provides on emission reductions. 
However, for developing countries non-binding targets may be a better choice since the 
possible emission mitigation effect may be higher than with fixed, binding targets, as these 
are likely to be rejected, or only accepted if they provide excess allowances (Philibert et al. 
2003). 
 
Bodansky (2003) outlines four main categories or levels of commitment:  
 
Non-binding “commitments” are an aim or a recommendation (“should” rather than 
“shall”). The emissions target in the UNFCCC for Annex I Parties, to return emissions to 
earlier levels (4.2a) or 1990 levels (4.2b) by the year 2000, was worded as an aim rather than 
a legal requirement. Other examples are commitments formulated in a very general sense, 
such as formulations in the UNFCCC on implementation of policies and measures, support of 
research and provision of regular reports (Höhne et al. 2003:25). 
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One-way (“no-lose”) commitments are an aim, although non-binding, which could have 
legal consequences if it can provide a country with certain legal benefits. “Project baselines 
established under Kyoto’s Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) are, in essence, one-way 
“commitments,” since a country (or firm) faces no penalty if its project exceeds a baseline, 
but receives certified emission reduction credits if the project reduces emissions below the 
baseline” (Bodansky 2003). 
 
Legally binding commitments could be expressed in binding language, ‘shall’, such as used 
in the targets and timetables in the Kyoto Protocol. “Even though most international 
commitments do not have any specific compliance mechanisms, they are legally binding and 
must be complied with by those states that accept the commitment” (Bodansky 2003). 
Kazakhstan has voluntarily applied to become a member of Annex I, but, once agreed by the 
COP, its target would nevertheless be binding Höhne et al. 2003:25). 
 
Enforceable commitments is a “binding commitment which can be subject to a mandatory 
compliance system, with authority to respond to violations, such as the dispute settlement 
system adopted under the World Trade Organization” (Bodansky 2003). A compliance 
procedure was finally established with the Marrakech Accords. However, imposing 
consequences for non-compliance assumes that the party has ratified the amendment to the 
Protocol. 
 
3.2.2 Choice of commitment types and policy tools 
In many cases there is no strict boundary between commitment types and policy tools. A tax 
on GHG emissions can be considered both a policy tool and a commitment type (which we 
have grouped under polices and measures). However, in this context we refer to such 
alternatives mainly as commitment types. One reason for the increased interest for 
commitment types is the US rejection of the Protocol and the launch of the intensity targets-
proposal. Another reason is that intensity targets and other alternatives to Kyoto-type targets 
are seen as a way of stimulating participation from Non-Annex I-Parties. As illustrated by 
Table 3.2, the three main commitment categories are emissions caps, financial commitment, 
and policies and measures. 
 
(i) Emission cap related commitments 
Absolute – Within international environmental agreements, there is a long tradition of 
negotiating fixed, absolute targets. Until recently, this option has also gained most attention in 
the climate change regime. The Kyoto Protocol requires industrialized countries to achieve 
predetermined, fixed levels of emissions for the 2008-2012 commitment period. Philibert et 
al. argue that absolute targets represent a “relatively simple form of quantitative objective to 
negotiate as well as to implement” (2003:14). A major advantage of using quantitative 
instruments (such as absolute targets) is that they ensure “certainty” with regard to emissions 
levels, although they leave the marginal and total costs of abatement uncertain. 
Indexed – Because emissions depend on a wide range of variables that are difficult to 
anticipate (economic growth, weather, technological change, etc.), an emission target can be 
pegged to one or more of these variables (e.g. emissions per unit of GDP), rather than defined 
in fixed terms, like the Kyoto targets. The Bush administration’s carbon intensity target and 
the proposed Argentine target are both examples of indexed GDP-based targets. Indexed 
targets are attractive since they allow higher emissions in cases of higher economic growth 
and may allow more stringent targets to be adopted if the uncertainty regarding costs is 
reduced (Philibert et al. 2003). That may make participation more attractive for developing 
countries and the US. Other authors who propose replacing absolute caps with indexed caps 
are Ellerman and Sue Wing (2003), Müller et al. (2002), Philibert and Pershing (2002), and 
Pizer (2003). However, indexed targets could lead to absolute increases in emissions in case 
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of strong economic growth. Furthermore, if economic recession should occur, a country with 
a carbon intensity target would face a double hit. Müller et al. 2002 and Moor et al. 2002 
recommend indexed targets only for developing countries. 
Table 3.2 Different types of commitments 
Commitment type Subcategory/example/description References 
Absolute emission cap 
Flat rate: every country reduces emissions by same percentage  
Differentiated: every country achieves predetermined, fixed levels of 
emissions, “Kyoto style” 
 
Indexed targets 
Such targets are indexed according to an agreed variable, e.g. on 
actual economic growth 
Carbon intensity: CO2 emissions per unit of GDP 
Bush’s Proposal: emissions per unit of GDP, proposal for voluntary 
developing country participation 
Argentine target: indexed GDP-based target, voluntary developing 
country participation. However, this is outdated since the DCs 
cannot participate in the Kyoto Mechanisms.  
Emissions per unit of e.g. population, exports, energy 
consumption, etc. 
Höhne et al. 
(2003); 
Baumert and 
Kete (2002); 
Girardin and 
Bouille (2003); 
Bouille and 
Girardin (2002); 
Conditional  
If the specified conditions are not satisfied, then the target either 
would not apply at all or would be modified in some fashion. E.g. 
the ‘Tonn target’: when a party’s emissions per capita exceeds 1 
metric tonne of Carbon, it has to participate in the regime  
 
 
Tonn 2003:299 
Emission caps 
 
 
 
 
Sectoral 
Specified targets for particular sectors or industries that are 
particularly important, politically easier to address, or 
comparatively insulated from international competition 
Bodansky 
(2003);  
Samaniego and 
Figueres 2002) 
Financial  Annex II parties are already committed to financial contributions 
– collectively – to the climate funds under both the UNFCCC and 
Kyoto Protocol (Marrakech Accords). A related commitment type 
is transfer of technology and knowledge to DCs. 
 
Policies and 
measures 
Countries obliged to implement coordinated policies and 
measures, e.g.: 
Technology and performance standards – e.g. generally agreed energy 
efficiency standards.  
Taxes – e.g. a common tax on CO2.  
Subsidy removal – elimination of climate adverse subsidies.  
Emissions trading— e.g. the European Union directive on emissions 
trading 
Technology R&D and incentives – that the parties are committed in 
various forms to participate in or contribute to e.g. an 
international hydrogen initiative. 
Höhne et al. 
(2003);  
Bodansky (2003) 
 
Conditional – In contrast to the Kyoto targets, which apply come what may, a target could be 
formulated in conditional terms: if the specified conditions are not satisfied, then the target 
either would not apply at all or would be modified in some fashion. One option is to make 
commitments conditional on a state’s achievement of a minimum level of wealth. For 
example, per capita GDP could be used as a “graduation criterion” for the assumption of 
commitments by developing countries (Tonn 2003). 
Sectoral commitments – A target can also be specified on a narrower basis than total 
national emissions. For example, targets could be specified for particular sectors or industries 
that are particularly important, politically easier to address, or comparatively insulated from 
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international competition. Sectoral targets might be a pragmatic first step towards more 
comprehensive action in developing countries. Sectoral targets might be fixed or indexed, 
“no-lose”, binding or non-binding (Philibert et al. 2003; Bodansky 2003). Sectoral targets 
could also be the natural progression in the evolution of the Clean Development Mechanism 
(CDM) (Samaniego and Figueres 2002). Under such a scheme, countries might choose to 
expand from a specific “project” under the CDM to a broad policy covering an entire sector, 
setting a no-lose, sectoral emission target. 
(ii) Financial commitments 
Rather than focusing on emissions, a target can be specified in financial terms, as an amount 
of money to be earmarked for climate change mitigation or adaptation, either domestically or 
internationally. Both the UNFCCC and the Marrakech Accords set forth collective financial 
commitments that apply to Annex II countries as a whole, rather than individual targets for 
each state. Related commitments could be expressed in terms of a transferral of know-how 
and technology to developing countries. 
(iii) Policies and measures 
In contrast to a target-based or quantified objective approach, a commitment regarding 
policies and measures is an obligation of conduct rather than an obligation of result: it 
requires countries to act in certain ways, but does not require them to achieve any particular 
level of emissions or financial contribution. During the negotiation of the Kyoto Protocol, the 
European Union pushed for the inclusion of commitments related to policies and measures, 
but due to strong resistance from the United States, the Protocol includes only an illustrative 
list of possible policies and measures, without requiring states to adopt them. An obligation in 
the UNFCCC commits all Parties to undertake policies and measures that help mitigate 
climate change. The policies and measures of current interest for either an extended Kyoto 
framework or alternatives to the Kyoto Protocol might be technology agreements and policy 
tools such as subsidy removal (i.e. elimination of coal production and consumption subsidies) 
and (GHG) taxes – e.g. a tax on CO2 (which could be harmonized across parties). 
Technology agreements – One means of promoting the development and diffusion of 
advanced technologies is focusing on an agreement – or a set of agreements – promoting 
climate-friendly technologies (Edmonds and Wise 1999; Benedick 2001; Barrett 2001, 2003). 
Such agreements could impose specific standards (e.g. energy efficiency) in a particular 
sector (e.g. power sector), or more directly subsidize research and development efforts. They 
may also aim at broadening existing markets for technologies such as renewable energy 
sources, as discussed during the World Summit on Sustainable Development. 
Technology agreements could possibly build on and link together current initiatives with 
similar aims, such as the IEA implementing agreements, the Climate Technology Initiative, or 
some programmes of the Global Environment Facility. The parties could be committed in 
various ways to participating in or contributing to technology R&D, e.g. an international 
hydrogen initiative. Barrett puts forward the case for a research and development protocol, 
founded on building incentives for climate-friendly technologies (2001, 2003).  This approach 
would involve establishing common technology standards and supporting collaborative 
research.  However, costs are a vital parameter for the feasibility of agreements, and while 
technology agreements can potentially promise a high degree of environmental effectiveness, 
they are unlikely to be the most efficient or cost-effective solution (Aldy et al. 2003a, b; 
Philibert et al. 2003). Furthermore, policy-makers take a risk if they start with sub-optimal 
(inefficient) institutions like technological agreements, since that could lead to a lock-in 
which may be difficult to change in the future (Woerdman 2002; Aldy et al. 2003a, b).  
Carbon taxes (or more generally GHG taxes) have been suggested as an alternative to the 
Kyoto framework. Under a commonly assessed form (Cooper 1998, 2001; Nordhaus 1998, 
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2002), domestic carbon taxes could be harmonized at the international level. In this case, 
carbon taxes would equalise the marginal cost of abatement globally and, like emissions 
trading, have the important feature of cost-effectiveness. However, such price instruments 
leave uncertain the level of actual emissions reductions that will be achieved by this system 
(Philibert et al. 2003:19). Moreover, an international carbon tax has been politically 
unacceptable to some developed countries – even more so than quantified commitments to 
limit emissions of GHGs, It also seems clear that developing countries would be unwilling to 
adopt such an instrument. 
All of these approaches might be able to complement one another, even though policies and 
measures and target-based approaches are often seen as competitors – or even contradictory. 
Bodansky claims that, “a target could be used to specify the overall result to be achieved, 
while policies and measures could specify the means for reaching that result… an 
international target and trading approach would be most cost-effective if combined with 
national policies and measures ensuring that domestic trading systems are complementary” 
(2003: 43). 
Quantitative commitments and emissions trading offer the possibility of addressing cost-
effectiveness and equity in allocating assigned amounts. As illustrated in the previous sub-
sections, there is a variety or a whole menu of possible future mitigation commitments, 
including quantified and non-quantified objectives, from which the parties may be able to 
choose. Some are most viable options for near-term commitments (in an extended Kyoto 
framework) and while others belong to alternative future frameworks. Philibert and Pershing 
(2003) claim that quantified objectives such as fixed targets, indexed targets, a price cap and 
non-binding targets, are compatible with an extended ‘Kyoto framework’. Within the Kyoto 
framework there might be alternatives to quantified objectives at the country level, namely 
policies and measures, technology agreements, carbon taxes, and sectoral targets. 
The Kyoto framework could also be modified in other ways to address the regularly 
addressed concerns of costs and thereby broaden participation:  
A price cap – Introducing a price cap could take the form of making supplementary permits 
available in unlimited quantity at a fixed price – at country level (for domestic entities) or at 
the international level (for countries). Emission trading systems with a price cap is also 
referred to as hybrid schemes (McKibbin 1997, 2000, 2002; Aldy et al. 2001). According to 
Philibert and Pershing (2003), “concerns have been raised that a price cap could undermine 
the environmental “integrity” of any agreement…While indexed targets might help deal with 
cost uncertainty driven by economic growth and other factors, price caps might help deal 
more broadly with abatement cost uncertainty. In particular, price caps could accommodate 
uncertainties in future technology developments and relative energy prices”. WBGU are 
sceptical to a price cap as a way of limiting the uncertainty around future costs of climate 
change mitigation, but proposes to establish a Climate Central Bank to avoid and smooth 
disproportionately strong price spikes (WBGU 2003:61). 
3.2.3 Who will be subject to commitments? 
A third dimension of commitment types is related to who should be subject to commitments. 
Even though the international climate negotiations so far have sought to establish obligations 
only for states (which are Parties to the Convention/Protocol), it is conceivable that private 
entities, such as firms, organizations or cities might be subject to some kind of commitments. 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, national governments can establish commitments for private 
entities as part of implementing the national emission target. However, it would be very 
difficult to impose obligations directly on private entities due to implementation and 
enforcement problems, in particular with respect to individuals and firms located in countries 
that are not participating in the international regime (Bodansky 2003: 44). 
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3.3 Differentiation of commitments   
This section addresses the somewhat contentious issue of how the global effort can most 
effectively be divided up among the participants of a future international climate regime, 
assuming that a climate target has been agreed. The subject is commonly referred to in the 
literature as burden sharing; however, we prefer to use the UNFCCC term ‘differentiation of 
commitments,’ which some argue has fewer negative connotations and is therefore less 
politically sensitive (Storey 2002; RIVM 2004). 
 
There are strong arguments in favour of an international approach to the climate change 
problem, both on economic and environmental grounds. Not only is global participation an 
important condition for cost-effectiveness, but stabilization of greenhouse gases in the 
atmosphere is unlikely to be feasible without a concerted international effort. In short, “a 
global problem such as climate change requires a global solution” (Houghton, IPCC 
Chairman, WG1). Given that involvement in international climate negotiations is voluntary, a 
necessary condition for the success of a future agreement is that it is both fair and perceived 
to be fair by all parties (Ashton and Wang 2003). Equity, however, is a subjective issue, and 
one which is often hard to disentangle from interests. Bush has stated, “I oppose the Kyoto 
Protocol because it exempts 80 per cent of the world, including major population centres such 
as China and India, from compliance, and would cause serious harm to the US 
economy…there is a clear consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective 
means of addressing global climate change concerns” (2001). At the same time, developing 
countries have also forwarded the equity argument, pointing to the fact that they are the least 
responsible for climate change, but most vulnerable to its consequences (Müller 2002a). How 
does one distinguish between the different responsibilities, capabilities and needs of the 
different parties when allocating commitments?   
 
Given that equity is likely to be central to this debate, we begin with a summary of the way in 
which the issue is currently dealt with in the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol (Section 3.3.1). 
This is followed by a discussion of how the concept may be applied to climate change (3.3.2). 
We then go on to provide an overview of the main approaches to allocating commitments 
(3.3.3), and conclude the section with a brief look at how differentiation methods may be 
evaluated (3.3.4). 
 
3.3.1 Equity and current climate agreements 
The issue of equity is a key feature of the UNFCCC (see Article 3.1, Box 3.2). The 
convention presents the climate system as a public good which everyone has a right to enjoy 
and a duty to protect. This entitlement extends across geographical and generational 
dimensions.15 Perhaps most significantly, it identifies “common but differentiated 
responsibilities” and commits developed countries to take the lead. 
 
In addition, the IPCC acknowledges that climate change can have implications for equity 
between and within nations (see Box 3.2).  
 
Equity is also addressed in the Kyoto Protocol, where commitments are already differentiated 
in the following manner: 
 Between Annex I and non-Annex I countries – the former have agreed to cut their 
collective emissions by 5.2 per cent below 1990 levels by 2010, the latter are exempt 
from specific targets. 
 Within Annex I countries – differentiated commitments range widely, with some countries 
obliged to make emissions reductions (e.g. the EU block must make cuts of 8 per cent), 
                                                     
15 Rose and Stevens relate the geographical (or ‘inter-country’) dimension to the concept of static 
equity and inter-generational dimension to dynamic equity (1998:332). 
CICERO Report 2004:02   Climate policy beyond 2012: A survey of long-term targets and future frameworks 
 
 
 
26
some having pledged to achieve stabilisation (New Zealand, Ukraine Russia) and others 
permitted to make increases (Iceland, Australia and Norway may oversee a rise of up to 
10, 8 and 1 per cent respectively). 
 
 
 “The Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations, on the 
basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective 
capabilities. Accordingly the developed country Parties should take the lead in combating climate change 
and the adverse impacts thereof” Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC, 1992 
 
“The challenge of climate change from an equity perspective is to ensure that neither the impact of climate 
change nor that of the mitigation policies exacerbates existing inequities both within and across nations” 
IPCC, Second Assessment Report, 1996 
  
“The impacts of climate change are likely to fall disproportionately upon the poorest countries and the 
poorest persons within countries, and thereby exacerbate inequities in health status and access to food, 
clean water and resources” IPCC, Third Assessment Report, 2001  
 
Box 3.2: UNFCCC and IPCC references to equity 
 
3.3.2 Principles of fairness 
There are numerous ways of defining, categorising and analysing principles of equity within 
the context of global climate change. Rose et al. (1998) offer a good starting point, by 
drawing a distinction between fairness criteria that relate to: (1) the initial allocation of 
commitments, (2) the final outcome of the implementation of an agreement, and (3) the 
process through which commitments are negotiated or allocated (see Table 3.4). Allocation-
based criteria interpret fairness in terms of inherent rights (e.g. egalitarian), while outcome- 
oriented approaches to equity are more concerned with the resulting net welfare implications 
of an agreement. 
Table 3.4 Alternative equity criteria for global warming policy. Source: Rose et al. 
1998:30 
Criterion Basic definition 
Allocation-based  
Sovereignty All nations have an equal right to pollute and be free from pollution 
Egalitarian All people have an equal right to pollute and be free from pollution 
Ability to pay Mitigation costs should vary directly with national economic well-being 
Outcome-based 
Horizontal All nations should be treated equally 
Vertical Welfare gains should vary inversely with national economic well-being; 
welfare losses should vary directly with GDP 
Compensation No nation should be made worse off 
Process-based  
Rawls’ Maxim Welfare of worst-off nations should be maximised 
Consensus International process is fair 
Market justice Market is fair 
 
The process-based perspective views the negotiation and allocation processes themselves as 
mechanisms for promoting for justice. While this may be a useful way of categorising fairness 
criteria, the majority of the literature (Claussen and McNeilly 1998; Carzorla and Toman 
2000; Berk and den Elzen 2001; CICERO/ECN 2001; Sijm et al. 2001; Evans 2002; Ringius 
et al. 2002; Storey 2002; Torvanger and Ringius 2002; Ashton and Wang 2003; Höhne et al. 
2003) refers to one or more of the following equity principles as a benchmark for evaluating 
burden sharing approaches: need, responsibility, opportunity, capacity, and comparability of 
effort. These criteria provide a valuable analytical tool, and are discussed in turn below. 
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Need 
This criterion adheres to the principle that everyone deserves the right to emit a minimum 
quantity of greenhouse gases that allows them to meet their basic human needs. It implies that 
any international climate agreement should help, or at the very least not hinder, a person’s 
ability to secure a decent standard of living.  
Responsibility  
Also referred to as ‘guilt’ in the literature (Berk and den Elzen 2001; CICERO/ECN 2001), 
this notion relates to the polluter pays principle, whereby the party responsible for causing a 
problem is expected to bear the cost of resolving it. The International Institute of Applied 
Systems Analysis (IIASA) estimates that industrialised countries are responsible for about 
two thirds of cumulative emissions since 1800, and it is partly for this reason that the Kyoto 
Protocol asks developed countries to lead the mitigation effort. Applying this principle from a 
burden sharing angle, however, becomes less straightforward when the link between cause 
and consequence is uncertain, as in the case of climate change. It also raises questions about 
whether or not a polluter can legitimately be held responsible for the harmful effects of their 
past actions when the dangerous implications of their behaviour was not known to them at the 
time. 
Opportunity 
Some countries, such as those with energy inefficient economies (i.e. high carbon intensity), 
are better placed than others to make low-cost emissions reductions, and it is argued that a fair 
agreement should take account of this.   
Capacity  
This relates to the idea of ability to pay for GHG emission reductions, and is usually 
measured in terms of GDP per capita. 
Comparability of effort 
Ashton and Wang claim that any agreement secured by a party must not only be formulated 
fairly and deemed acceptable in its own right, but must also be seen to be just in relation to 
the deals negotiated by others (2003:66). 
Before we apply fairness principles, however, it is necessary to outline the various burden 
sharing alternatives for an international climate agreement. This is addressed in the next 
section. 
3.3.3 Distribution of mitigation commitments 
Choosing a suitable method for distributing climate change mitigation commitments is a 
politically sensitive task due to its associated cost implications at the national level. There are 
essentially two basic questions to be answered: (1) which indicator(s) should be used as a 
basis for differentiating commitments? and (2) how should this indicator be applied to 
determine specific national obligations? To illustrate this two-step process, the Kyoto 
Protocol uses national 1990 emission levels as an indicator, i.e. a ‘grandfathering’ approach, 
and allocates allowances as a percentage of these emissions. The percentages vary across 
nations as a result of the Kyoto Protocol negotiations. Another example is taking per capita 
emissions as an indicator and applying it by promoting convergence towards a common level 
in the future across all countries. Other examples of possible differentiation criteria can be 
found in Box 3.3 below. 
 
Various methods have been proposed for allocating responsibilities among the parties to a 
potential climate change agreement. Table 3.5 summarises some of the main approaches that 
have been suggested. The first five can be thought of as ‘single dimensional’ because they use 
just one indicator to determine national contributions. As discussed above, grandfathering is 
based on a historical benchmark. The historical responsibility approach, as proposed by 
Brazil, focuses on cumulative past emissions, arguing that those who have contributed most to  
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 Current or historic emissions 
 Contribution to temperature increase 
 Population 
 GDP or other measure of wealth or income 
 Geographic area 
 Reduction potential 
 Costs or benefits of reductions 
 Sectoral benchmarks 
 A combination of sectoral targets added to a national target 
Box 3.3 Potential differentiation criteria. Source: Höhne et al. 2003 
the global warming problem in the past should bear the greatest responsibility for making 
future emissions reductions.16 The third option is founded upon the basic human right to equal 
treatment, and involves allocating commitments so that per capita emissions are equalised 
over time. This alternative has gained support in recent years, and is often presented as part of 
a broader climate model of ‘contraction and convergence,’ which was developed by the 
Global Commons Institute, proposing that emissions contract over time and converge at a 
level where per capita emissions are equalised by a given date. Ability to pay is commonly 
framed in terms of GDP per capita. Torvanger et al. (2004) compare the effect of several of 
the approaches in Table 3.5 in meeting a long-term temperature target. Differentiation of 
emission allowances in eight global regions is based on per capita mitigation and climate 
change damage costs, where the costs are weighted according to GDP per capita, greenhouse 
gas intensity of GDP, or historical contribution to global warming. Furthermore these results 
are compared to two allocation-based approaches, per capita convergence by 2070 and the 
Brazilian historical responsibility proposal.   
 
More sophisticated, ‘multi-dimensional’ proposals such as the multi-sector, multi-criteria and 
menu options have also captured the attention of scholars and policy-makers. The appeal of 
multi-sector approaches lies in their capacity to take into account the specific circumstances 
of the individual parties. For example, the Triptych proposal uses analysis of three sectors 
(the energy intensive industry, the power producing sector and the domestic sector) as a tool 
for determining allowances. This methodology was used by the EU to allocate Kyoto 
emissions targets between Member States, and the model has since been adapted to apply to 
the global level, and extended to include emissions of gases more relevant to developing 
countries. ECN/CICERO have adopted a similar approach at the global level (Multi-Sector 
Convergence), but extend their analysis to seven sectors (power, industry, transport, 
households, services, agriculture and waste) and aim for converging per capita emissions. It 
also makes provision for countries with special national circumstances.  
 
Multi-criteria proposals, on the other hand, are flexible in that they allow several indicators or 
‘differentiation criteria’ to be taken into account when allocating commitments. Müller’s 
Preference Score model incorporates grandfathering and per capita allocations, while 
Claussen and McNeilly (1998) include responsibility for past and present emissions, ability to 
pay, and opportunity to reduce emissions.  
 
A ‘menu approach,’ which was proposed by Japan during the Kyoto negotiations, presents an 
alternative whereby countries are given the freedom to choose between options – in this case 
between emissions per unit of GDP and emissions per capita. The Japanese example also 
allows emissions reduction rates to be adjusted for countries with high population growth. 
                                                     
16 The fourteenth session of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA) 
have produced an evaluation of the scientific and methodological aspects of the Brazilian Proposal (see 
UNFCCC 2002), and Romstad et al. (2003) give an outline of the Proposal and discuss the choices 
associated with allocating responsibilities on the basis of historical emissions. 
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Table 3.5 Proposals for differentiation of commitments 
Proposal Description References 
Grandfathering Allocation based on a historical emissions baseline  
Historical 
responsibility/ 
cumulative 
emissions/polluter 
pays principle 
Brazilian Proposal advocates emissions target 
allocation according to responsibility for climate 
change (historical accumulated emissions) 
UNFCCC (1997); den Elzen 
et al. (1999) 
Equalising per 
capita emissions 
Per capita emissions are equalised over time. 
Associated with ‘contraction and convergence’ 
Agarwal and Narain (1991); 
UNFCCC (1996, 1997) 
(France; Switzerland; EU); 
Manne and Richels (1997); 
Meyer (2000); Aslam (2002); 
WBGU (2003) 
Ability to pay  
 
Allocation based on GDP per capita UNFCCC (1996, 7) (Poland; 
Estonia, Russia; South 
Korea); Jacoby et al. (1999); 
Torvanger et al. (2004) 
Equalising costs Commitments distributed to equalise marginal 
abatement costs across countries 
UNFCCC (1997) (New 
Zealand) 
Triptych approach covers three sectors and 
“accounts for differences in national circumstances 
such as population size and growth, standard of 
living, economic structure and fuel mix in power 
generation” 
Global Triptych an extension of the Triptych 
approach from the regional to global level 
Extended Global Triptych includes CH4, N2O, and 
CO2 from forestry 
Blok et al. (1997); Phylipsen 
et al. (1998a, 1998b); 
Groenenberg et al. (2001) 
 
Groenenberg et al. (2002);  
 
Höhne et al. (2003) 
Multi-sector or 
“bottom-up” 
approaches  
 
CICERO/ECN’s Multi-Sector Convergence model aims 
for converging per capita targets based on a fixed 
convergence year; takes into account structural 
differences between countries based on analysis of 
seven sectors 
Sijm et al. (2001) 
Multi-criteria 
formula 
 
Hybrid formula distinguishing between countries on 
the basis of various criteria: e.g. responsibility for 
past and present emissions, ability to pay and 
opportunity to reduce emissions; grandfathering 
and per capita allocations 
UNFCCC (1996, 1997) 
(Norway; Iceland; Australia); 
Ringius et al. (1998); 
Claussen and McNeilly 
(1998); Müller (2002b) 
Menu approach Countries may themselves select from up to three 
abatement strategies, provisions are made for 
countries with high population growth 
UNFCCC (1996, 1997) 
(Japan) 
Sources: Evans 2002; Ringius et al. 2002; Ghersi et al. 2003; Storey 2002; WBGU 2003. 
 
 
3.3.4 Evaluating methods for differentiating commitments 
Differentiation options can be evaluated according to various criteria, ranging from the 
principles of fairness discussed in 3.3.2, to factors such as political feasibility and cost 
allocation. While we leave a more thorough discussion of how climate policy frameworks as a 
whole can be analysed to the following section, we conclude Section 3 by returning to the 
issue of equity, and briefly investigate the extent to which proposals for the differentiation of 
commitments meet the fairness criteria identified previously – namely, need, responsibility, 
opportunity, capacity, and comparability of effort.   
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Table 3.6: Evaluation of proposals for differentiation of commitments with respect to 
equity. Source: Storey 2002:31 
 
 
Table 3.6 demonstrates how a selection of ‘single dimensional’ differentiation options 
measure up against four equity criteria.17 The results demonstrate that there is a trade-off 
between the various equity dimensions and that no one approach to differentiation satisfies all 
of the criteria completely. The per capita emissions approach fares best in terms of need, but 
less well with respect the other factors, most notably, opportunity. Cumulative emissions 
proposals are strongest at meeting the responsibility criterion, but once again barely fulfil the 
opportunity requirement. GDP per capita is the best all-round performer of the six, partially 
fulfilling all four criteria and largely fulfilling the capacity criterion, which no other option 
achieves.  
 
However, it is important to remember that evaluating proposals for differentiation solely on 
the grounds of fairness misses the broader picture. The equity dilemma should be viewed 
within the wider context of political acceptability; after all, in practical terms, “equity 
principles will not override other elements of national self-interest” (Cazorla and Toman 
2000:5). Torvanger and Ringius (2002) take into account a number of political and 
‘operational’ factors in their discussion of criteria for ‘burden sharing rules’. This study 
examines both fairness principles and ‘operational requirements’ such as universal 
applicability, ease of implementation, simplicity, flexibility, allowance for future refinements, 
and provision for country-specific circumstances. Furthermore, there is a considerable body 
of literature that investigates the cost implications of using various differentiation schemes 
(see Manne and Richels 1997; Rose et al. 1998; van Vuuren et al. 2003; Torvanger et al. 
2004). 
 
Just as equity is only one of the criteria upon which differentiation options may be assessed, 
proposals for allocating commitments are only one component of a comprehensive climate 
policy framework – albeit a crucial one. We therefore take our analysis a step further in 
Section 3.4, where we consider an extended list of criteria – containing political 
                                                     
17 Two proposals are found in this table that have not so far been introduced as possible ways of 
allocating commitments in 3.3.3.  Flat rate targets imply that every country reduces emissions by the 
same percentage, which we have excluded as an option due to the fact that it is not seriously considered 
to be a viable alternative.  Intensity targets, i.e. allocating emissions per unit of GDP, has been 
mentioned within the context of Section 3.2 as we believe that such targets are strictly speaking 
‘commitment types’ rather than ways of differentiating commitments.   
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considerations (including equity considerations), environmental effectiveness, economic 
concerns, and operational criteria – which can be used to evaluate global climate policy 
frameworks. 
 
3.4 Criteria for assessing future climate policy frameworks 
The criteria for evaluating the potential future climate regimes can be divided into four main 
categories: how environmentally effective a proposal is; whether or not it is politically 
feasible; the extent to which it takes into account economic considerations such as cost-
effectiveness; and how practical the proposal is in terms of the ease with which it can be 
negotiated and implemented. We discuss each of these inter-related factors in turn below. 
Environmental effectiveness 
As a point of departure, it is logical to expect any measures to combat climate change to be 
environmentally effective. Evans (2002:5) makes this point clearly, stating that 
“environmental effectiveness – measured in terms of the ability of a policy to stabilise 
atmospheric concentrations of GHGs – is…the overriding priority of international climate 
policy. Political considerations of equity, efficiency and so on must take second place to this 
priority: there would be little point in implementing a politically feasible approach that isn’t 
up to the environmental job in hand.” Höhne et al. (2003:33) define environmental 
effectiveness in terms of stringent emissions targets, international participation, and the 
encouragement of early action. Global participation is an important safeguard against 
‘leakage’ and reduces the likelihood that the mitigation efforts of participants in a climate 
regime will be undermined (or even negated) by the activities of those outside it. One 
example of such leakage is increased oil consumption and related carbon dioxide emissions 
by countries outside of the climate regime, caused by a lower oil price due to smaller demand 
from the countries participating in the regime. 
Political feasibility 
While environmental effectiveness is clearly an important characteristic of a potential future 
framework, no agreement can ignore the political context. At the end of the day, a modest 
agreement that is ratified and implemented is of greater value than an ambitious proposal that 
fails for political reasons. We therefore introduce political feasibility as a second essential 
feature of a potential future climate framework. The term is to be distinguished from political 
acceptability on the grounds that a proposal may be acceptable to all parties, but infeasible 
due to its complexity or on account of practical obstacles such as insufficient or incomparable 
data (Torvanger and Ringius 2002:224). Equity issues also fall within this category, as 
appeals to fairness are often used to underpin political arguments (Ashton and Wang 
2003:61). Höhne et al. (2003:33-4) propose that two political criteria should be met for an 
optimal outcome to be achieved: an agreement should be compatible with the positions of the 
major actors, and should respect three key equity principles, namely, need, capacity and 
responsibility. Ringius et al. (2002) argue that that need, taken as basic human needs, is the 
most important fairness principle to satisfy, followed by capacity, and finally responsibility. 
Cost-effectiveness 
The ideal outcome would ensure that costs at the global level are kept to a minimum. In 
economic terms, this is achieved by equalising marginal abatement costs both within and 
between countries. However, it is important to distinguish between global and national costs, 
as it is latter that will be the most crucial in determining whether or not an agreement is 
ratified (Philibert and Pershing 2001:213). Höhne et al. stress that any agreement that is to 
meet the necessary economic criteria must, first of all, take into account the structural 
differences between countries, and secondly, allow countries sufficient flexibility to meet 
their commitments in the way that is most cost-effective given their particular circumstances 
(Höhne et al. 2003:34). For example, individual countries may want to focus on different 
sectors and gases.   
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Operational considerations 
The ease with which an agreement can be negotiated and implemented falls within the fourth 
group of criteria, also referred to in the literature as ‘operational’ (Torvanger and Ringius 
2002) or ‘technical’ factors (Höhne et al. 2003). Although these considerations have political 
connotations, they essentially apply to the operational feasibility of a proposal. For example, 
from a negotiation perspective, it is an advantage that an agreement is simple and involves as 
few separate decision-making processes as possible (Torvanger and Ringius 2002:224; Höhne 
et al. 2003:34). Furthermore, the methods and data necessary for formulating the agreement 
and for implementing targets should be accessible and verifiable. For this reason it has been 
proposed that a future agreement be, as far as possible, compatible with existing UNFCCC 
and Kyoto Protocol structures and frameworks (Höhne et al. 2003:34). 
Other criteria 
Other factors that are also relevant to the design of future regimes include the following: 
flexibility to incorporate new information (Aldy et al. 2003a, b:378); capacity to provide for 
changes in national circumstances (Torvanger and Ringius 2002:225); institutional efficiency 
and effectiveness (NIES/IGES 2003); institution building (Berk et al. 2001a:28), capacity 
building (Berk et al. 2001a:28), dynamic efficiency (Aldy et al. 2003c:375-6); the role of 
technology (Berk et al. 2001a:28); incentives for participation and compliance (Aldy et al. 
2003c:378); and the contribution to economic growth and sustainable development (Philibert 
and Pershing 2001:213). 
Inter-linkages and conflicts  
It is important to note that many of these criteria are inter-linked, and that conflicts between 
them are likely to mean that no single agreement will be able to fulfil all of the above criteria. 
For example, improving cost-effectiveness will not always result in the most environmentally 
sound or politically expedient outcome for all parties. Similarly, a simple proposal makes the 
negotiation process easy, but failure to take into account individual circumstances may make 
the scheme unpopular. Therefore, coming to an agreement means finding the right balance 
between the various factors and reaching a compromise that is acceptable to as broad a 
constituency as possible. 
 
Evaluating proposals 
Conducting a comprehensive evaluation of potential future climate policy frameworks is 
beyond the scope of this paper, although we refer the reader to studies by Höhne et al. (2003) 
and Aldy et al. (2003), which assess a selection of proposals using different combinations of 
the criteria discussed above. Their results can be found in the Annex. 
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4 Adaptation and sustainable development  
In terms of political feasibility, it is of central importance that a future climate regime is 
perceived to be equitable and fair (as discussed in Sections 3.3 and 3.4). In addition to the 
issues we have already raised in this context, there are two further areas that deserve specific 
attention. As illustrated by the events at COP8, key developing country concerns also relate to 
(1) impacts, vulnerability and adaptation, and (2) sustainable development. Many believe that 
unless these issues are addressed it will be difficult to ensure the “meaningful participation” 
of developing countries. An overview of these two themes is presented in the two sections 
below. 
4.1 Vulnerability and adaptation 
Background 
The UNFCCC mentions both mitigation and adaptation as measures to address climate 
change; however, adaptation has traditionally had a low-profile in international climate 
policy. Rather than being viewed as an issue requiring specific attention, adaptation was 
assumed to take place largely as a matter of course (Parry et al. 1998; Kates 2000). Moreover, 
dedicating resources to supporting adaptation was thought to detract from the main task in 
hand, namely, making emissions reductions. This was reflected in the IPCC’s Second 
Assessment Report, which focused heavily on mitigation options and energy policy (Kates 
1997).   
The publication of the Third Assessment Report in 2001, however, represented a symbolic 
turning point. It offered the clearest indication yet that human-induced climate change was 
underway, and gave a more balanced treatment to adaptation and mitigation (McCarthy et al. 
2001; Klein et al. 2003). Furthermore, three new funds for adaptation were established later 
that year at COP7.18 As a result, adaptation has received increased attention in academic and 
policy spheres (Burton et al. 2002; Klein et al. 2003), and is expected to gain further 
recognition in the Fourth Assessment Report due in 2007.     
Bridging the divide 
Despite these developments, COP8 and 9 demonstrated that the Parties are still very much 
divided in terms of their willingness to address the issue of adaptation. At COP8, for example, 
the G-77 countries, and particularly the host India, were keen to discuss adaptation more 
explicitly, while Annex I Parties (with the exception of the US) preferred to focus on 
mitigation. Ott (2003) argues that the failure of COP8 to initiate discussion of commitments 
beyond 2012 was partly due to the Annex I-Parties’ lack of response to the concerns of the 
developing countries. Müller (2002a) sees this as a problem of differing perceptions of 
climate change, with the industrialized north viewing ‘nature’ as the main victim, while the 
poorer south see innocent humans as the prime sufferers. Developing countries feel that while 
they are least responsible for climate change, they are most likely to face its severest 
consequences; at the same time, they are the worst-equipped to deal with them (IPCC 2001a, 
b). Climate change is seen to be an immediate threat to coping strategies, and legitimate 
concerns have been raised that preparations for adaptation have so far been inadequate (Ott 
2003). Some developing country representatives argue for the need to redress the balance of 
the climate regime by referring to two articles of the Convention (Müller 2002c: 14):  
                                                     
18 It is important to note that the Adaptation Fund under the Kyoto Protocol is the only fund dedicated 
solely to adaptation, while the Special Climate Fund and the Least Developed Countries Fund, both 
under the Framework Climate Convention, are supposed to handle adaptation alongside a number of 
other issues.  
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The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country 
Parties, especially those that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse 
effects of climate change...should be given full consideration.     
UNFCCC Article 3.2 (Principles) 
The developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in 
Annex II shall also assist the developing country Parties that are 
particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change in 
meeting costs of adaptation to those adverse effects.                     
UNFCCC Article 4.4 (Commitments) 
Both of these articles clearly state that the developed world has a responsibility to assist 
developing countries in reducing vulnerability to climate change. 
While it is clear that any successful future climate regime must take into account the concerns 
of both the developed and the developing world, bridging the gap in priorities outlined above 
is further complicated by the fact that Annex I and the G-77 are far from homogenous entities. 
The US, for example, has been known to play devil’s advocate to Annex I’s proposals and 
side with developing countries on occasion (Ott 2003). The G-77, meanwhile, is only a loose 
international alliance, with starkly diverse political and economic interests. This negotiating 
cohort represents nations ranging from the poorest LDCs and climate-vulnerable small island 
developing states (SIDS), to the oil-rich OPEC members and powerful economies such as 
China. Finding an outcome that is satisfactory to each and every party therefore presents a 
great challenge.   
Seeking synergies between mitigation and adaptation 
One potential way forward is to heed calls for a dual approach to climate change and 
investigate how potential synergies between adaptation and mitigation strategies might be 
achieved. Synergies are created when climate policy implementation has a positive effect on 
both mitigation and adaptation efforts, producing win-win situations (Kane and Shogren 
2000). One such example would be planting trees in cities, which would serve to reduce heat 
stress and sequester carbon simultaneously (Klein et al. 2003). At the international level, there 
is potential for synergies between the implementation of the UNFCCC and other 
environmental agreements, such as the Convention on Biodiversity and the Convention to 
Combat Desertification. 
Klein et al. (2003), however, warn against an over-reliance on synergies. They argue that the 
scope for achieving win-win outcomes is limited due to the fact that (1) different actors are 
usually involved in mitigation and adaptation efforts, (2) it is unlikely that there are sufficient 
opportunities for synergies to produce the necessary levels of mitigation and adaptation, and 
(3) there is a good chance that mitigative and adaptive measures carried out separately will 
have a higher net impact than if the equivalent resources are invested in synergies alone. 
An optimal mix of mitigation and adaptation? 
As mitigation and adaptation are not thought to be generally complementary (Michaelowa 
2001), economists have more recently channeled their energies towards identifying the 
optimal mix of adaptation and mitigation. Klein et al. (2003) are once again skeptical towards 
this approach, stressing that no single optimal mix exists due to uncertainty, differing local 
circumstances, and contrasting preferences and values in society. Instead they advise that a 
socially, economically and environmentally justifiable mix is sought, which will vary over 
space and time. 
The road ahead  
Unfortunately, there does not appear to be a simple way of integrating mitigation and 
adaptation in future international climate policy. However, what is clear is that securing the 
support of developing countries is contingent upon greater attention being paid to the issues 
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that concern them, such as adaptation.19 Investigating the potential solutions will require 
further research.  Some innovative, preliminary suggestions have included establishing an 
‘Impacts Protocol’ by 2005 (Müller 2002a, c), and the introduction of an ‘Impacts and 
Adaptation Protocol’, which could be seen as a suitable counterbalance to the mitigation-
centric Kyoto Protocol. India also launched the idea of a separate Impacts Protocol under the 
Convention ahead of COP8. The reasoning behind calls for a separate protocol dealing with 
impacts and adaptation is that the Kyoto Protocol’s main focus is on the UNFCCC Article 2’s 
first paragraph, which concerns itself with mitigation and the stabilization of greenhouse 
gases.  Proponents assert that a truly balanced climate convention should also address Article 
2’s other objectives relating to impacts and adaptation (see Section 2.2.1.ii).  
 
4.2 Sustainable development 
The World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) defined sustainable 
development as, “development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the 
ability of future generations to meet their own needs” (WCED 1987:43). It emphasizes “the 
essential needs of the world’s poor, to which overriding priority should be given,” and also 
stresses limitations, such as “the environment’s ability to meet present and future needs” 
(ibid.). The concept therefore takes an integrated approach to addressing the issues of 
economic growth, environmental protection and social justice (across geographical and 
temporal dimensions).    
The Kyoto Protocol deals with sustainable development through its Clean Development 
Mechanism (CDM), which has the dual aim of assisting developing countries in achieving 
sustainable development (Article 12) and improving the global cost-effectiveness of 
emissions reductions. However, it has been argued that projects that are attractive in terms of 
greenhouse gas abatement might not necessarily promote sustainable development.  Indeed, 
Kolshus et al. (2001) find that there is a trade-off between cost-effectiveness and 
sustainability indicators.    
The potential weakness of the CDM as the sole instrument for promoting sustainable 
development, combined with the reluctance of developing countries to commit to the 
international climate change effort, has led some commentators to call for a fresh approach.  
They have suggested that a good way of encouraging developing countries to participate in a 
global regime would be to set the issue of climate change firmly within a sustainable 
development context (Beg et al. 2002; Metz et al. 2002; Winkler et al. 2002b; Davidson et al. 
2003; Najam et al. 2003).  This would give more weight to the priorities of developing 
nations – namely, poverty reduction, economic growth, and income distribution. Such a view 
is taken by Metz et al. (2002), who see flaws in other alternatives.  They are skeptical towards 
approaches such as convergence proposals, which they believe are too politically contentious, 
and intensity targets or multi-stage approaches, which they fear will be incompatible with 
low-stabilization levels. Instead they propose that framing climate change as a developmental 
rather than an environmental problem offers the best solution. Stressing that climate change 
has implications for development goals would improve the political acceptability of a global 
climate agreement among developing countries. A broader sustainable development strategy 
could be integrated into a system of differentiated commitments, and be supplemented by 
measures to assist technology transfer, improve energy efficiency, and promote clean air 
policies and sustainable forest management. 
                                                     
19 Equity issues (as discussed in Section 3.3.2) and sustainable development (see 4.2) are also salient 
here. 
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4.3 Summary 
What appears to be increasingly apparent is that if the developed world is interested in 
securing the participation of developing countries – which is a precondition for an 
economically and environmentally effective climate agreement – it cannot afford to ignore the 
very real concerns of developing nations. Unless adaptation, development and equity issues 
are explicitly addressed during the post-2012 climate negotiations, it is hard to foresee that 
developing countries will join an international climate regime of the future.  
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5 Major conclusions and recommendations  
5.1 Design of future climate policy 
In this section we summarize and discuss what we believe to be the most promising ideas and 
interesting results for developing future climate policy. A well-designed climate policy should 
meet criteria such as environmental integrity (achieving deep global GHG emission 
reductions), cost-effectiveness, political feasibility (broad participation), and technical 
feasibility (in negotiations and implementation). 
The major conclusions of this survey are summarized in six points:  
1. A flexible approach is needed to ensure broad participation and significant emission 
reductions. The flexibility could be along four dimensions: choice of commitment type(s), 
methods of differentiating across countries, timing with regard to when certain groups 
(foremost poor countries) take on commitments, and inclusion of substances that indirectly 
affect climate. 
2. Progress in negotiations will be best served by more focus on moving in the right long-term 
direction in order to keep future options open than on meeting specific short-term global 
emission caps.  
3. Mitigation costs and participation attractiveness should be given sufficient attention when 
evaluating different emission paths meeting the same temperature increase ceiling. 
4. All things considered, concentration and temperature targets are a better choice than 
impacts-based targets. However, better information on the distribution in time and space of 
impacts given a climate change scenario is a valuable input to decisions on emission, 
concentrations and temperature based targets. 
5. A coalition of most willing nations could be an interesting supplement to a global UN-
based process (building on UNFCCC and the Kyoto Protocol), and in particular if the Kyoto 
Protocol should fail. 
6. Some type of international coordination of climate policy is required because of both cost-
effectiveness concerns (to employ flexibility mechanisms) and attractiveness for broad 
participation. Increased cost-effectiveness could make more ambitious policies attainable. 
Nations’ willingness and efforts to manage the climate system given its nature as a global 
common property resource will be conditional on the efforts by other nations.  
 
Norway’s contributions in particular can include the following:  
 
1. Norway can contribute to bridging countries across the Atlantic and the North-South 
climate policy cleavage. In this regard Norway can take advantage of its good relations 
with developing countries and its large official development aid contributions. There is a 
potential for better integration of sustainability and climate policies in development 
policies and assistance. Furthermore, Norway could contribute to better integration of 
climate change impacts and adaptation, and emission abatement policies. 
2. As a country with a strong climate research tradition, Norway could invest in 
conducting more research to explore essential post-2012 issues. 
3. From a national perspective, Norway should consider its interest in future negotiations. 
For instance, does Norway prefer to build on the global Kyoto structure or on a more 
regional approach involving the most willing nations? 
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7 Annex 
Table A1: Alternative international policy architectures for global climate change. Source: Aldy, Barrett and Stavins 2003 
Alternative  Environmental Outcome  Dynamic Efficiency  Cost-effectiveness  Distributional Equity  Flexibility  Incentives for Participation 
and Compliance  
Kyoto 
Protocol  
Probably low, given short-
term nature of 
commitments, and poor 
incentives for participation 
and compliance.  
Requires reductions that 
are too large in short run, 
and silent on reductions 
required for long run.  
Flexible mechanisms help cost-
effectiveness, but non-
participation by key countries 
reduces cost-effectiveness; CDM 
burdened by transactions costs.  
Only industrial countries (ICs) 
face targets, but developing 
countries (DCs) help shape 
rules. DCs receive some 
adaptation assistance.  
Emission ceilings are locked 
in, but only for five-year 
periods.  
Incentives for participation 
and compliance are very 
weak.  
Aldy, Orszag, 
& Stiglitz 
(2001)  
Depends on safety valve 
price and extent of 
developing country 
participation.  
Allows for policies that 
could be consistent with 
dynamic efficiency.  
International emissions trading 
with a safety valve would likely 
result in common price for all 
participants.  
Delays mandatory emissions 
commitments by DCs. Safety 
valve funds to DCs for 
abatement efforts.  
Commitments and safety 
valve price adjusted over 
time in response to new 
information.  
Use of sanctions, especially 
on trade, to promote 
compliance. Incentives for 
developing country 
participation.  
Barrett (2001, 
2003)  
Depends on the agreed 
standards.  
Technology lock-in may 
impair efficiency, but 
increased R&D may also 
lower costs.  
Would not equalize marginal 
costs across all sectors.  
R&D funded according to UN 
scale. ICs pay for technology 
adoption by DCs; adaptation 
funded by ICs.  
R&D protocol provides 
information about 
technologies to lower costs, 
but standards may create 
lock-in.  
R&D investment, economies 
of scale, network 
externalities, and trade 
restrictions create incentives 
for participation. No need to 
enforce compliance.  
Benedick 
(2001)  
Depends on levels for 
R&D, technology 
standards, etc.  
Technology lock-in may be 
a problem, but public 
sector R&D may lower 
costs.  
Would not be a global agreement, 
and would not equalize marginal 
costs across all sectors.  
ICs to transfer new 
technologies to DCs. US to 
show leadership in reducing 
emissions unilaterally.  
R&D would provide more 
information about new 
technologies.  
Participation deliberately 
restricted, at least initially 
and in some areas. No 
explicit mention of 
compliance.  
Bradford 
(2002)  
Would depend on the 
magnitude of financial 
contributions to the central 
authority.  
Could potentially support a 
dynamically efficient 
outcome.  
Common offer bid for emissions 
allowances to all countries would 
insure cost-effectiveness.  
Financing obligations would 
reflect ability to pay and 
expected benefits from 
mitigating climate change.  
Central authority could adjust 
emissions allowances 
purchases with new 
information over time.  
Does not explicitly address 
enforcement of financing 
obligations.  
Cooper (1998, 
2001)  
Would depend on the level 
of the carbon tax.  
Could potentially support a 
dynamically efficient 
outcome.  
Common carbon tax would be 
cost-effective.  
Tax would be uniform, but part 
of revenue could be 
redistributed to DCs.  
Tax level can be changed, to 
adjust to new information.  
Does not incorporate explicit 
mechanisms. Relies on a 
“commitment” to treaty 
objectives  
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Table A1: Alternative international policy architectures for global climate change (continued). Source: Aldy, Barrett and Stavins 2003 
Alternative  Environmental Outcome Dynamic Efficiency  Cost-effectiveness  Distributional Equity Flexibility  Incentives for Participation and Compliance 
Hahn (1998)  Depends upon levels at 
which instruments are set 
Depends upon levels and 
time paths of instruments. 
Could be cost- effective, due to 
reliance on market- based and 
related instruments. 
Depends upon allocations. Very flexible; instruments 
that perform best are 
continued. 
No attention is given to 
participation and compliance. 
McKibbin & 
Wilcoxen 
(1997, 2000, 
2002) 
Relatively low carbon 
emissions price implies 
modest near-term 
emissions reductions. 
Could potentially support a 
dynamically efficient 
outcome. 
Common carbon price across all 
countries supports cost-effective 
implementation. 
DCs would receive emissions 
endowments in excess of 
current emissions. 
Decadal negotiations to 
select carbon price allows for 
accounting of new 
information. 
Does not substantially 
address participation or 
compliance issues. 
Nordhaus 
(1998, 2002) 
Relatively low carbon tax 
implies modest near-term 
emissions reductions. 
Could potentially support a 
dynamically efficient 
outcome. 
Harmonized carbon tax insures 
cost- effective implementation 
among participating countries. 
Participation conditional on per 
capita income. DCs would also 
likely receive financial 
transfers. 
Periodic international votes 
allows for adjusting carbon 
tax to new information. 
Promotes compliance 
through trade measures. 
Developing country 
participation supported 
through financial transfers 
Schelling  
(1997, 1998)  
Would probably have little 
effect on emissions.  
Does not front-load 
mitigation. Promotes R&D 
to reduce future mitigation 
costs. 
Would aim to reduce emissions 
globally.  
Financial transfers to DCs.  Emphasizes the need to act, 
rather than to meet a 
particular target 
Enforcement of compliance 
not needed by design.  
Schmalensee  
(1996, 1998)  
Little effect in short run, 
but significant effects in 
long term.  
If targets are sufficient, 
could be dynamically 
efficient.  
Could be cost-effective, due to 
reliance on market-based and 
related instruments.  
Little attention given to 
distributional equity in the 
cross-section, but could provide 
intertemporal equity.  
Quite flexible, due to focus 
on beginning with modest 
targets.  
No attention given to 
participation and compliance 
issues.  
Stavins  
(2001b)  
Abatement would be very 
modest in the short term, 
but much more ambitious 
in the long term.  
If targets are sufficient, 
could be dynamically 
efficient.  
Could be cost-effective, due to 
reliance on tradable permits, 
carbon taxes, and hybrid systems.  
Addresses cross-sectional 
distributional equity through 
allocation of permits and use of 
growth targets.  
Long-term targets are 
flexible, to allow for effects 
of learning.  
Little attention to 
participation and compliance, 
except for incentives for 
DCs.  
Stewart & 
Wiener 
(2001)  
Would depend on the 
magnitude of the 
“headroom” allowances 
given to DCs.  
Dynamic efficiency 
weakened by participation 
& compliance problems.  
Reliance on an expanded CDM, 
and participation and compliance 
problems undermine cost-
effectiveness.  
Headroom allowances to DCs 
plus emissions trading provide 
potential economic gains to 
poor countries.  
Emission commitments 
would need to be periodically 
negotiated.  
Similar to Kyoto Protocol, 
with exception of incentives 
from “headroom” 
allowances.  
Victor (2001)  Similar in targets to KP, 
but with safety-valve sales 
of additional permits.  
Better than KP in its 
emission path, but not 
defined.  
Includes flexible mechanisms of 
Kyoto Protocol; hence, can be 
cost-effective.  
By bringing DCs into set of 
nations facing binding 
constraints only as they become 
more wealthy, equity is 
addressed.  
Subsequent periods would 
need to be renegotiated.  
Compliance is considered 
through buyer liability 
scheme, but participation is 
not addressed.  
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Table A2: Indicative assessment matrix for the qualitative comparison of the 
approaches. Source: Höhne et al. 2003 
 
 
 
 
